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INTIMATE FEMICIDE: A STUDY OF SENTENCING TRENDS
FOR MEN WHO KILL THEIR INTIMATE PARTNERS
ISABEL GRANT*
This article examines sentencing trends over the
past 18 years for men who kill their intimate partners.
Using a sample of 252 cases, the article demonstrates
that sentences for second degree murder rose
significantly after the Supreme Court of Canada's
decision in Shropshire but have more recently levelled
off to a range that is still higher than the pre-
Shropshire era. With respect to manslaughter, the
amendments to the Criminal Code making the spousal
nature of the crime an aggravating factor and
changing social attitudes have resulted in increasingly
severe sentences for spousal manslaughters. While a
large number of the cases in this sample involved the
intoxication of the accused and/or the victim, the
defence of intoxication rarely reduced murder to
manslaughter. Similarly, the number of successful
provocation defences was lower than expected
Cet article examine les tendances relatives 9, la
sentence des 18 dernikres annees en ce qui concerne
les hommes ayant tu6 leur partenaire intime. Grdce e6
un 9chantillon de 252 causes, l article ddmontre que
les sentences pour meurtre au deuxi~me degrg ont
considrablement augments aprks la dcision
Shropshire de la Cour supr~me du Canada; elles se
sont par la suite stabilisdes 6t un niveau toujours
superieur 6 ce qu 'elles taient avant la ddcision
Shropshire. En ce qui concerne l 'homicide involontaire
coupable, les amendements au Code criminel qui
aggravent lefacteur du crime et changent les attitudes
sociales ont entrane des sentences de plus en plus
sv res pour homicide involontaire coupable d'un
conjoint. Alors qu 'un grand nombre de causes de cet
9chantillon impliquaient I'intoxication de I "accus6 et
(ou) de la victime, la defense pour intoxication r~duit
rarement le crime de meurtre b homicide involontaire
coupable. Le nombre de difenses r~ussies pour
provocation tait 6galement inf~rieur aux attentes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE GENDERED NATURE OF SPOUSAL HOMICIDE
In recent years, considerable attention has been given in academic legal literature to the
prosecution of women who kill their abusive partners.' However, women are much more
likely to die at the hands of a violent partner than they are to kill that partner to escape the
violence. Approximately 60 women in Canada are killed each year by their intimate (or
former intimate) partners.2 In many cases, the homicide is not the first incident of violence
against the victim by the accused.3 Women are at greatest risk when they are separated from
their male partner or when they have announced their intent to separate.4 In some cases, men
kill not only their spouse, but also other family members or members of their spouse's
extended family.5 Particularly after multiple familial homicides, men may commit, or
attempt, suicide.6 Some groups of women are at greater risk, notably younger women and
Aboriginal women.7 Additional risk factors include a history of violence in a previous
intimate relationship, a common-law relationship (as opposed to a legal marriage),8 the
presence of guns, alcohol abuse, and pregnancy.9 Women are at greatest risk in their own
homes,' ° and the presence of children in the home does not appear to be a protective factor.
See e.g. Tim Quigley, "Battered Women and the Defence of Provocation" (1991) 55 Sask. L. Rev. 223;
Martha Shaffer, "The Battered Woman Syndrome Revisited: Some Complicating Thoughts Five Years
After R. v. Lavallee" (1997) 47 U.T.L.J. 1; Julianne Parfett, "Beyond Battered Woman Syndrome
Evidence: An Alternative Approach to the Use of Abuse Evidence in Spousal Homicide Cases" (200 1)
12 Windsor Rev. Legal Soc. Issues 55; Elizabeth Sheehy, "Battered Women and Mandatory Minimum
Sentences" (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 529; Regina A. Schuller, "Expert Evidence and Its Impact on
Jurors' Decisions in Homicide Trials Involving Battered Women" (2003) 10 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol'y
225; John W. Roberts, "Between the Heat of Passion and Cold Blood: Battered Woman's Syndrome as
an Excuse for Self-Defense in Non-Confrontational Homicides" (2003)27 Law & Psychol. Rev. 135;
Carol Jacobsen, Kammy Mizga & Lynn D'Orio, "Battered Women, Homicide Convictions, and
Sentencing: The Case for Clemency" (2007) 18 Hastings Women's L.J. 31.
2 Average, 1996-2005: Geoffrey Li, "Homicide in Canada, 2006" (2007) 27:8 Juristat 1.See Canada, Department of Justice, Report on Sentencingfor Manslaughter in Cases Involving Intimate
Relationships (Calgary: Federal-Provincial-Territorial Ministers Responsible forJustice, 2003), online:
Department of Justice Canada <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/dept-min/pub/smir-phiri/index.html>
[Manslaughter Study]. See also Measuring Violence Against Women: Statistical Trends 2006 by Holly
Johnson (Ottawa: Minister of Industry), online: Statistics Canada <hnp://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-570-
x/85-570-x2006001-eng.pdf> [Measuring Violence].Rosemary Gartner, Myrna Dawson & Maria Crawford, "Women Killing: Intimate Femicide in Ontario,
1974-1994" (1998-99) 26 Resources for Feminist Research 151 at 158 ["Femicide in Ontario"]. The
authors were able to identify motives in approximately 75 percent of the cases. In 45 percent of those
cases "one motive clearly predominated: the offender's rage or despair over the actual or impending
estrangement from his partner." Suspected or actual infidelity accounted for another 15 percent while
the culmination of ongoing serial abuse was the motive in 10 percent. Five percent were attributable to
life circumstances "such as bankruptcy, job loss, or serious illness" and in 3 percent of the cases, there
was evidence that the offender was mentally ill (at 163).
5 Ibid. at 163. The study states that in addition to the killing of the intimate partner and, in some cases, the
suicide of the offender, 74 additional persons were killed in the context of intimate homicide, most of
whom were children of the victims.
6 Manslaughter Study, supra note 3. Suicide after spousal homicide is almost entirely a male phenomenon.
Between 1974 and 2000, 28 percent of male offenders but only 3 percent of female offenders took their
lives following the incident, a total of 564 men and 15 women. In "Femicide in Ontario," ibid, the
authors found that 31 percent of offenders killed themselves after killing their female partners.
"Femicide in Ontario," ibid. at 159. The authors note that "Aboriginal women's rates of spousal
homicide are between five and ten times higher than the rates for non-Aboriginal women."8 Ibid. at 157. The authors suggest that "common-law partners are more likely to be poor, young,
unemployed, and childless - all factors associated with higher homicide rates" (at 159). The authors
also suggest that men are less secure in their proprietary claims in common-law unions than in marriage.
See also Margo Wilson, Holly Johnson & Martin Daly, "Lethal and Nonlethal Violence against Wives"
(1995) 37 Can. J. Crim. 331 at 343.
Manslaughter Study, supra note 3.10 "Femicide in Ontario," supra note 4 at 158.
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For example, in a study of femicides from 1974-94, 100 children witnessed their mothers'
deaths."
In this article, I examine judicial approaches to sentencing for men who kill their intimate
partners. I have two reasons for focusing on men who commit spousal homicide. First, as
noted above, women are much more likely to be killed by intimate partners than are men.
One study found that more than three-quarters of all spousal homicides recorded in Canada
between 1974 and 2000 were committed by men against women. 12 Second, spousal
homicides committed by men against women are distinct from spousal killings committed
by women. At the risk of oversimplifying the difference, men who kill their spouses often
do so out ofjealousy, possessiveness, or to prevent the spouse from leaving the relationship
or entering a new relationship. These crimes bear unique characteristics:
Men perpetrate familicidal massacres, killing spouse and children together; women do not. Men commonly
hunt down and kill wives who have left them; women hardly ever behave similarly. Men kill wives as part
of planned murder-suicides; analogous acts by women are almost unheard of. Men kill in response to
revelations of wifely infidelity; women almost never respond similarly.
13
When men kill their intimate partners, the killing is sometimes the final act of violence
against a spouse after a period of repeated abuse. In contrast, women who kill their spouses
are more likely to kill to protect themselves (and their children) from further violence at the
hands of their partner. Thus, violence against women is often a precipitating factor in spousal
killings committed by both men and women. 4 The proliferation of programs to assist abused
women appears to have resulted in a reduction of women killing their male spouses rather
than a reduction of men killing their spouses.' 5 It has been suggested that giving women a
safe place to go may, paradoxically, increase violence by jealous and controlling spouses.' 6
Some researchers identify the underlying dynamic for men who kill their spouses or
former spouses as men's proprietary claim over women. The idea that "if I cannot have her,
no one will" fits with the reality that women are most likely to be killed when they attempt
to leave the relationship. Rosemary Gartner, Myrna Dawson, and Maria Crawford present
this concept as follows: "an extreme, if apparently incongruous manifestation of male
proprietariness is intimate femicide. If unable to control or coerce his partner through other
means, a man may exert the ultimate control over her by killing her."' 7
While significant scholarship exists regarding the factors that lead to spousal homicide, 8
there is a dearth of literature on what factors the courts consider in sentencing an individual
I I Ibid. at 163.
12 See Valerie Pottie Bunge, "National Trends in Intimate Partner Homicides, 1974-2000" (2002) 22:5
Juristat 1 at 13.
13 Russell P. Dobash et al., "The Myth of Sexual Symmetry in Marital Violence" (1992) 39:1 Social
Problems 71 at 81.
14 See "Femicide in Ontario," supra note 4; Manslaughter Study, supra note 3.
15 Myrna Dawson, Examination of Declining Intimate Partner Homicide Rates: A Literature Review
(Ottawa: Department of Justice, Research and Statistics Division, 2001).
16 Ibid.
17 "Femicide in Ontario," supra note 4 at 160.
18 Ibid.; Wilson, Johnson & Daly, supra note 8.
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convicted of the culpable homicide of his intimate partner. This article begins to address that
void.
B. OBJECTIVES
This article looks at sentences imposed on men who killed their intimate female partners
over a period of 18 years to identify trends in sentencing patterns and judicial attitudes
towards spousal homicide. Spousal killings span the range of first and second degree murder
as well as manslaughter, although convictions for first degree murder are less common in this
context. Using a sample of 252 cases, this article demonstrates that, while the line between
second degree murder and manslaughter can be a fine one, a conviction for manslaughter
instead of murder has a very significant impact on how long an offender is incarcerated.
Identifying the homicide offence for which the individual is convicted is the key determinant
of sentencing. Accordingly, this article also examines the factors that reduce murder to
manslaughter focusing on provocation and intoxication, which are particularly relevant in the
spousal homicide context.
Finally, this article examines the impact of two recent changes in the law of sentencing.
First, s. 718.2 of the Criminal Code19 was amended in 1995 to provide that it is an
aggravating factor in sentencing if the victim is the accused's spouse or if the accused
violates a position of trust vis-A-vis the victim.2 ° These statutory factors apply to
manslaughter sentencing and setting the period of parole ineligibility for second degree
murder. Second, in Shropshire,2 the Supreme Court of Canada opened the door to higher
periods of parole ineligibility for second degree murder generally, and to a more deferential
standard of appellate review.
Historically, intimate femicide was often characterized as a less serious example of
culpable homicide. There are a few reasons why this may have been the case. First, spousal
killings are inextricably linked to domestic violence, which our legal system traditionally
viewed as a private rather than criminal matter.22 Second, men who killed their partners were
often viewed as less culpable due to the "emotional" nature of such crimes.23 Finally, judges
have tended to view spousal killings as less blameworthy than stranger killings: the accused
was characterized as less of a continuing threat to society where he "only" killed his spouse.2
This article demonstrates that, in recent years, there has been a trend towards harsher
sentences for spousal homicides and an increasing awareness that the intimate nature of the
crime is an aggravating, not a mitigating, factor. This is not to suggest that higher sentences
19 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
20 Section 718.2 was enacted by An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (sentencing) and Other Acts in
consequence thereof S.C. 1995, c. 22, s. 6.
21 R. v. Shropshire, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227 [Shropshire].
22 Mark Anthony Drumbl, "Civil, Constitutional and Criminal Justice Responses to Female Partner Abuse:
Proposals For Reform" (1994) 12 Can. J. Fam. L. 115.
23 For example, the defence of provocation developed out of a judicial belief that men who killed
adulterous wives should be partly excused: see Jeremy H order, Provocation andResponsibility (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1992) at 24.
24 See R. v. Jackson (1996), 184 A.R. 93 (C.A.) [Jackson], where a man who killed his spouse was viewed
as deserving of a lesser sentence than a man who killed a stranger.
(2010) 47:3
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are inherently good, but it does demonstrate where judges place spousal killings on the
gradations of fault.
With respect to provocation and intoxication, the article illustrates that both of these
defences have had a relatively low success rate in recent years. Although the majority
decision in Thibert25 seemed to suggest that a spouse's jealous reaction to his estranged
wife's new partner may provide a sufficient basis for a provocation defence,judges following
that decision have applied the defence cautiously, and juries do not often accept the defence.
The concern that Thibert would lead to separation per se being regularly relied on to support
provocation appears to have been unfounded.26 However, the few cases in which provocation
is successful raise some troubling questions about whether in fact the accused's
blameworthiness should be construed as less than that of a murderer. With respect to
intoxication, triers of fact appear even more reluctant to allow the defence to be used to
reduce an offender's culpability to manslaughter. In fact, some of the cases in the sample
show that intoxication has been treated as an aggravating factor in sentencing.
Because of the legislative and jurisprudential changes relating to sentencing for spousal
homicide, it is difficult to attribute a trend towards increased sentences to any one particular
factor. For example, the trend towards harsher sentences for spousal manslaughter may be
a result of both s. 718.2 of the Criminal Code and of changing judicial attitudes towards
spousal violence. It is possible that s. 718.2 itself merely reflects a change in societal (and
perhaps judicial) attitudes about the seriousness of spousal violence. Parole ineligibility
periods for second degree spousal murder convictions may have increased as a result of s.
718.2, Shropshire, or a combination of both.
C. THE DATA
This article uses a sample of all reported spousal homicide cases available on Quicklaw,
Westlaw, and CanLII between January 1990 and June 2008. Cases were also found using the
Canadian Sentencing Digest and the Department of Justice Manslaughter Study. 7 The
sample included 252 cases.
The term "spousal" is used broadly in this article and includes married and common-law
relationships as well as estranged, separated, or divorced relationships. Although cases
involving dating relationships were excluded, sometimes cases using the term "girlfriend"
involved a common-law relationship and thus, were included. A majority of these cases are
at the appellate level,28 predominately involving appeals by the defence.
This sample is clearly not comprehensive of all spousal homicide cases and thus the
results do not paint a complete picture of the phenomenon of spousal homicide in Canada.
In this sample, convictions will inevitably be overrepresented because of the large number
25 R. v. Thibert, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 37 [Thibert].
26 In R. v. Lees, [1999] B.C.J. No. 1294 (S.C.) (QL), affd 2001 BCCA 94, 148 B.C.A.C. 253 [Lees], for
example, both an impending separation and a threat to falsely accuse the defendant of sexually abusing
his daughter were not sufficient to satisfy the objective test for provocation. The Court of Appeal agreed
with this assessment.27 Manslaughter Study, supra note 3.
28 There are 161 appellate decisions.
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of defence appeals. Furthermore, this article will not catch acquittals where the Crown does
not appeal or cases where there was a guilty plea and no written reasons for sentence. The
sample bias in favour of convictions does not detract from the analysis of sentencing because
only convictions lead to a sentencing decision. Similarly, it should not distort the defences
of provocation and intoxication since both lead to a conviction for manslaughter, and not an
acquittal.29 This sample does demonstrate the significant difference between sentences for
manslaughter and those for second degree murder, which in turn highlights the importance
of defences (or plea agreements) that reduce second degree murder to manslaughter.
The sample includes cases dealing with 252 accused persons. Because there may be
multiple judgments dealing with one accused person, the total number of trials, sentencing
hearings, and appeals exceeds 252. The sample consists of 16 trial decisions, 98 sentencing
decisions, 161 appeals on liability issues, and 55 appeals from sentence. Of the 161 appeals,
152 are appeals from conviction by the accused and only nine are appeals by the Crown.3"
In only three of these cases was the Crown appealing from an acquittal as opposed to a
reduced verdict.3' There are 12 Crown sentence appeals.
TABLE 1
OVERVIEW OF SPOUSAL HOMICIDE CASE SAMPLE
First Degree Second Degree Manslaughter Not Criminally Acquittals New Trial Totals
Murder Murder Responsible Ordered
Charge 87 145 20 252
Outcome 45 (9)* 134 (13)* 65(2)* 6 2 24 252
* The bracketed numbers indicate cases where a new trial was ordered and information on the ultimate outcome at the subsequent trial
was unavailable.
Of the 252 cases, 87 involved charges of first degree murder, 145 involved a charge of
second degree murder, and 20 involved manslaughter charges. The conviction information
paints a significantly different picture from that of the charging pattern. There were 45
convictions for first degree murder, 134 convictions for second degree murder, and 65
convictions for manslaughter. Thus, fewer than half of the first degree murder charges
resulted in convictions for that offence, and there were three times more manslaughter
convictions than there were manslaughter charges. This suggests that some overcharging
and/or significant plea bargaining occurs. There were six findings of not criminally
responsible on account of a mental disorder"2 and two acquittals. Although acquittals are
29 It is possible that cases involving a successful intoxication or provocation defence are less likely to be
appealed by the accused although some of these cases will come to light as sentencing decisions and/or
Crown appeals.
30 There were 317 separate decisions included in the sample. Fourteen involved both an appeal from
conviction and a sentencing appeal; one involved both an appeal from conviction and a sentencing
decision.
31 R. v. Jack (1993), 88 Man. R. (2d) 93 (C.A.); R. v. Charemski, (1998] 1 S.C.R. 679; R. c. Laflamme
(1999), 141 C.C.C. (3d) 74 (Qc. C.A.).
32 While these cases are beyond the scope of this article, it is fair to say that in five of them there was very
strong evidence of mental illness. See R. v. Di Media, [1996] Q.J. No. 1440 (S.C.) (QL); R. v.
McDonald, 2002 BCSC 269, [2002] B.C.J. No. 552 (QL); R. v. Singh, 2003 BCSC 1455, [2003] B.C.J.
No.2226 (QL); R. v. Weldon (1995), 86 O.A.C. 362, where the Court of Appeal found a jury conviction
to be unreasonable and substituted a verdict of not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder.
(2010) 47:3ALBERTA LAW REVIEW
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under-represented in this sample, the rate of convictions in spousal homicides is generally
high.33
While each of these cases involved its own unique mix of brutality and loss, after reading
more than 250 judgments, one is struck by the similarity of the cases. The relationship has
often been characterized by ongoing violence or persistent arguments. 34 The quarrels are
frequently triggered by the accused's suspicions of infidelity, which are occasionally
substantiated, but more often not. 35 Alcohol is very often a precipitating factor even where
the state of intoxication is not sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter. The victim is
often also intoxicated. While there are some cases where the woman is killed by a single stab
wound or gunshot, the degree of "overkill" in these cases is very disturbing. It is not
uncommon to see descriptions of 20 to 40 stab wounds,36 or cases where multiple means are
used to cause death, such as stabbing, strangulation, and a beating.37 Where there is evidence
of provocation on the part of the deceased, it is often verbal, rather than physical, and trivial
in nature.3"
II. SENTENCING TRENDS IN SPOUSAL HOMICIDE
A. THE SENTENCING REGIME
Sentencing anchors the entire legal regime for culpable homicide. The only real impact
the type of homicide charge or the degree of murder has on the accused relates to sentencing.
For first degree murder there is a mandatory life sentence and a mandatory period of parole
ineligibility of 25 years.39 For second degree murder there is also a mandatory life sentence
but the parole ineligibility period will be set by the trial judge at somewhere between 10 and
In the sixth case, R. v. Sullivan (1995), 54 B.C.A.C. 241, by contrast, the Court of Appeal upheld ajury
finding of not criminally responsible in a case where the accused claimed to suffer a severe
psychological blow from the words of his wife. The case resembles a number of second degree murder
cases where the parties had been drinking and returned home arguing. The evidence of mental disorder
was questionable at best. It is important to note that this case was tried before the Supreme Court of
Canada's judgment in R. v. Stone, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290 [Stone].33 See Myrna Dawson, CriminalJustice Outcomes in Intimate and Non-lntimate Partner Homicide Cases
(Ottawa: Department of Justice, Research and Statistics Division, 2004). This report states that accused
persons who killed their intimate partners are more likely to plead guilty and more likely to be convicted
overall than accused persons who killed non-intimate victims.34 This is consistent with the social science data generally. Between 1991 and 2004 there was a history of
domestic violence in 59 percent of homicides against women by their male partners: see Measuring
Violence, supra note 3.35 On the role ofjealousy in spousal homicides, see Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, "Till Death Do Us Part"
in Jill Radford & Diana E.H. Russell, eds., Femicide: The Politics of Women-Killing (New York:
Macmillan, 1992) at 86-89.
36 See e.g. R. v. Young (1993), 117 N.S.R. (2d) 166 (C.A.) [Young] involving more than 20 stab wounds
with a hunting knife; R. v. Hanna (1993), 27 B.C.A.C. 42 where the victim suffered an ongoing and very
brutal beating; R. v. Sychuk, [1990] A.J. No. 6 (C.A.) (QL) [Sychuk] where the victim suffered 22 stab
wounds, broken bones, and blunt force trauma to her face; Stone, supra note 32 where the accused
stabbed his wife more than 40 times; Jackson, supra note 24 where the accused stabbed his wife 59
times with a pocket knife.37 See e.g. R. v. Curry, 2004 BCCA 144, 197 B.C.A.C. 6 [Curry] involving lacerations to the hands and
face, a brutal beating, and ultimately strangulation; Samson c. R., 2005 QCCA 1151, [2005] J.Q. no
17404 (QL) where the victim's home was set on fire after she was shot and killed inside; R. v. Tate, 2002
BCCA 189, 169 B.C.A.C. 175 where the victim was force-fed sleeping pills and then attacked with a
pick axe.
3 See e.g. R. v. Kent, 2005 BCCA 238,29 C.R. (6th) 33 [Kent]; R. v. Muir (1995), 80 O.A.C. 7 [Muir].
9 Criminal Code, supra note 19, ss. 235(l), 745(a).
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25 years after a recommendation from the jury.4" Finally, for manslaughter, there is a
maximum life sentence with no minimum sentence except where a firearm has been used,
in which case there is a mandatory four years of imprisonment.4 Where a firearm is not used,
the range is anything from a suspended sentence to life imprisonment.42
This article focuses on sentencing for second degree murder and manslaughter while less
attention is given to the first degree murder cases. It is difficult to draw conclusions about
sentencing from the first degree cases because the trial judge has no discretion whatsoever
in imposing sentence. A brief description of the first degree cases follows primarily to
distinguish them from the second degree murder cases.
B. FIRST DEGREE MURDER
Because the sentence for first degree murder is fixed by law, there is no opportunity for
the trial judge to assess the seriousness of the particular crime. If there is ajury, it will make
the determination as to whether a murder is first or second degree. If first degree, the trial
judge then automatically imposes a life sentence with a parole ineligibility period of 25
years. A killing does not constitute first degree murder unless it fits within one of the criteria
set out in s. 231 of the Criminal Code, which include, in this context, planned and deliberate
murders,43 contract murders," and murders during the course of a forcible confinement," a
sexual assault,46 or criminal harassment.47
Information regarding the grounds for first degree murder is available for 44 of the 45
cases where a conviction was entered at trial. Of these 44 cases, 40 were based on planning
and deliberation under s. 231(2). In one of these cases s. 231(5)(b), which elevates death
caused while committing sexual assault to first degree, was also raised while in another s.
231(6) involving criminal harassment was also raised.48 In three cases, allegations were made
solely under s. 231(5) where it was alleged that death occurred while the victim was forcibly
confined or sexually assaulted.49 In a fourth case, the allegation was made under s. 231(3),
contract murder.50
40 Ibid., s. 236. Whenever the accused is sentenced to more than 15 years of parole ineligibility, whether
for first or second degree murder, he can apply after 15 years to have that period reduced but this does
not apply to murders involving multiple victims (s. 745.6). Note that the Conservative government
announced its plans to get rid of the "faint hope clause" in June 2009: see "Tories move to eliminate
faint-hope clause from Criminal Code" The Globe and Mail (5 June 2009), online: The Globe and Mail
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/tories-move-to-eliminate-faint-hope-clause-from-
criminal-code/article I 170810/>.
41 See Criminal Code, ibid., s. 236. In R. v. Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96, the Supreme Court
of Canada upheld this mandatory minimum sentence.
42 A conditional sentence is no longer available for manslaughter: see Criminal Code, ibid., ss. 742.1,752.
43 Ibid., s. 231(2).
44 Ibid., s. 231(3).
45 Ibid., s. 231(5)(e).
46 Ibid., s. 231l(5)(b).
47 Ibid., s. 231 (6).
48 R. v. Tavenor (2001),140 O.A.C. 78 [Tavenor] (Criminal Code, ibid, s. 231(5)(b)); R. v. Bradley, 2003
PESCTD 30,32 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 225 [Bradley] (Criminal Code, s. 231(6)).
49 R. v. Haolnuck(1996), 151 N.S.R.(2d)81 (C.A.) [Halnuck];R. v.Liu (2004),190 C.C.C. (3d) 233 (Ont.
C.A.); R. v. Bohnet, 2003 ABCA 207, 339 A.R. 175.
so R. v. McCaw, [1998] O.J. No. 730 (C.A.) (QL).
ALBERTA LAW REVIEW (2010) 47:3
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Bradley" is the only case relying on s. 231(6), which elevates murders that occur during
the course of a criminal harassment to first degree. However, even Bradley, which involved
overwhelming evidence of harassment, also relied on planning and deliberation. In Bari,
52
s. 231(6) was not raised even though the accused had already been convicted of criminal
harassment against the victim.
Thus, planning and deliberation is by far the most common route to a first degree murder
conviction. The basis for such a finding is often established through evidence of motive such
as an insurance policy,53 infidelity on the part of the accused or the deceased, 4 a custody
dispute,55 or the accused's unhappiness over the fact of estrangement.
56
The planned and deliberate nature of most first degree spousal murder cases makes such
killings distinguishable from second degree and spousal manslaughter cases, which tend to
occur in the course of a domestic assault or dispute. For example, first degree murders are
more likely to take place outside the home than manslaughter or second degree murder
cases57 and more likely to involve firearms.58 Financial motives, such as an insurance policy,
are much more common in first degree murder cases.59 The accused may be characterized as
in dire financial straits; an insurance policy may be the only evidence supporting planning
and deliberation.60
The first degree murder cases are more likely to involve estranged spouses where the
accused is angry over the split.6' He may attend the victim's place of work62 or her home63
to commit the crime. It is not uncommon for first degree cases to involve multiple victims;64
such cases occur more frequently where the spouses are estranged.65 Intoxication appears to
51 Supra note 48. Section 231(6) was added to the Criminal Code as part of Bill C-27, An Act to amend
the Criminal Code (child prostitution, child sex tourism, criminal harassment and female genital
mutilation), S.C. 1997, c. 16.
52 R. v. Bari, 2006 NBCA 119,308 N.B.R. (2d) 247 [Bari].
53 See e.g. R. v. Grewall, 2001 BCSC 45,[2001] B.C.J. No.75 (QL) [Grewalt]; R. v. Khan, 2001 SCC 86,
[2001] 3 S.C.R. 823 [Khan]; R. v. Ragunauth (2005), 203 O.A.C. 54 [Ragunauth]; R. v. Beaucage
(2005), 200 O.A.C. 149 [Beaucage].
54 See e.g. R. v. Holtam, 2002 BCCA 339, 168 B.C.A.C. 278 where the Crown alleged that Mr. Holtam
murdered his wife and daughter and attempted to murder his son to prove his level of commitment to
the woman with whom he was having an extramarital affair. See also Tavenor, supra note 48 where the
Crown relied on testimony of an informant that indicated Tavenor had confronted the victim prior to her
death about sleeping with other men.
55 See e.g. R. v. Merz (1999), 46 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.) [Merz].
56 See e.g. Bari, supra note 52 where the accused wrote letters to relatives that indicated his anger and
belief that his estranged wife should not be allowed to live if she would not reconcile with him.
57 See e.g. R. v. Wallen, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 827 [Wallen] where the accused shot his wife at the law firm at
which she worked after harassing her there previously. This case might well have constituted a murder
in the course of a criminal harassment had that legislation been enacted at the time. See also R. v.
Belowitz (1990), 38 O.A.C. 189; R. v. Wolfe, 2003 BCSC 505, [2003] B.C.J. No. 1054 (QL) [Wolfe].
58 Grewall, supra note 53; Khan, supra note 53; Ragunauth, supra note 53; R. v. Samuels (2005), 198
O.A.C. 109; Beaucage, supra note 53.
59 For example, in Beaucage, ibid. at para. 5, the Court noted "a $200,000 life insurance policy that the
appellant and the victim had purchased shortly before her death" as the motive for the killing.
60 See e.g. Beaucage, ibid; Ragunauth, supra note 53; Grewall, supra note 53; Khan, supra note 53.
61 See e.g. R. v. Boussaada, 2004 ABQB 401, 360 A.R. 113 [Boussaada]; Bradley, supra note 48; Merz,
supra note 55; Wallen, supra note 57.62 See e.g. Wallen, ibid.
63 See e.g. Boussaada, supra note 61; Bradley, supra note 48; R. v. Peepeetch, 2003 SKCA 76, [2004] 1
W.W.R. 552; R. v. Desmond, 2002 NSCA 40, 203 N.S.R. (2d) 67; Halnuck, supra note 49.
64 Of 43 cases where the information was available, seven involved multiple victims: see e.g. Wolfe, supra
note 57. Mr. Wolfe shot his estranged wife and her new lover.
65 Of seven multiple victim cases in the sample, five involved an estranged spouse. See e.g. Wolfe, ibid.
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be involved less often in first degree murder cases than in manslaughter or second degree
cases probably because of the high incidence of planning and deliberation.66
1. THE ROLE OF ALCOHOL IN NEGATING PLANNING AND DELIBERATION
In order to assess the relevance of intoxication in negating planning and deliberation, all
87 cases in which the accused was charged with first degree murder were examined. Of the
16 cases in which intoxication was involved, there were six first degree convictions, eight
second degree convictions, and two manslaughter convictions.6 7
Of the 16 cases involving intoxication, the relationship between intoxication and planning
and deliberation was a significant factor in only three cases.68 In two of these cases, Bradley
and Allen,69 the accused's assertion of intoxication sufficient to negate planning and
deliberation failed. In both of these cases, the purposive nature of the accused's behaviour
and the post-offence conduct of the accused were sufficient to establish planning and
deliberation.7"
In Wallen,7 the accused's first degree murder conviction was overturned and a new trial
ordered after a divided Supreme Court of Canada held that the trial judge should have
instructed the jury that a lesser level of intoxication is required to negate planning and
deliberation than is required to negate mens rea. However a differently constituted majority
agreed that "there is no hard and fast rule that the trial judge must always give explicit
instructions clearly distinguishing between the degree of intoxication necessary to negative
intent to kill and that necessary to negative planning and deliberation."72 This decision was
followed in Allen, where the accused's first degree murder conviction was upheld after the
trial judge's charge on planning and deliberation was found to be sufficient. The
Newfoundland Court of Appeal affirmed that the jury must consider intoxication when
determining whether the accused had the capacity to plan and deliberate and whether he did
plan and deliberate.7
In one additional case, R. v. Daley,74 an appeal based on the defence of intoxication went
all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada. While there was significant evidence of
intoxication, it was not related to the issue of planning and deliberation but only to whether
66 There was evidence that the accused was intoxicated in 65 out of the total 252 cases in the sample (26
percent). Out of 87 cases in which the accused was charged with first degree murder, only 16 (18
percent) involved intoxication.67 In Wallen, supra note 57, the appeal from conviction for first degree murderresulted in anew trial being
ordered.
68 R. v. Allen (1994), 120 Nfd. & P.E.I.R. 188 (Nfld. C.A.) [Allen]; Wallen, ibid.; Bradley, supra note 48.
69 Allen, ibid.
70 In Bradley, supra note 48, the accused had been arguing with his estranged spouse and attempting to
enter her apartment. He left temporarily after the police were called, but returned later with an axe,
which he used to break into the building and kill his former spouse. The accused in Allen, ibid., was
involved in a custody dispute with his common-law wife. Prior to the murder, the accused went to his
mother's house and retrieved a shotgun and ammunition, which he later used to kill his ex-wife. After
shooting the victim, the accused told police that he had made up his mind to kill his ex-wife the previous
day.71 Supra note 57 at para. 6. A majority of the Court held that such an instruction was not required in every
case.72 Ibid. at para. 10. See also Allen, supra note 68 at paras. 69-70.
73 Allen, ibid. at para. 71.
74 2007 SCC 53, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 523.
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the accused had the mens rea to commit murder. It is not clear why the effect of drunkenness
on the issue of planning and deliberation was not considered.
Given the role of alcohol in spousal violence and homicide, and the fact that the majority
of first degree cases are based on planning and deliberation, it is surprising that more first
degree murder cases in the sample did not involve assertions of intoxication negating
planning and deliberation. It is plausible to suggest that the Crown was more likely to accept
a plea to second degree murder or manslaughter where significant intoxication was involved.
The higher incidence of cases involving alcohol in the second degree murder and
manslaughter cases would support this speculation.75
C. SECOND DEGREE MURDER
Unlike first degree murder, the sentencing regimes for second degree murder and
manslaughter both provide discretion to trial judges to recognize a wide range of culpability
within each offence. Therefore, an examination of the sentences meted out for second degree
spousal murder and manslaughter reveals information about judicial attitudes about the
culpability of such crimes. Because second degree murder carries a mandatory life sentence,
the sentencing judge's discretion lies in setting the period of parole ineligibility.
The second degree murder cases paint an all too familiar picture. A majority of the killings
take place in the home, intoxication by alcohol or drugs by either or both the victim and the
accused is common, and a large number of cases involve arguments and fights that got out
of hand. These are very similar to the manslaughter cases and the line between the two
offences is often very fine. The degree of intoxication, whether there was any provocation,
whether mens rea can be established, and whether a guilty plea to manslaughter was accepted
are the determining factors in the offence for which the accused is ultimately convicted.
Until the mid- 1990s, the killing of a spouse was not viewed as a particularly serious form
of second degree murder and changes were slow to develop.76 In the mid-1990s, the Ontario
Court of Appeal took the approach that the spousal nature of the murder did not necessarily
justify an increase in parole ineligibility. In Pabani,77 the Court of Appeal reduced a 12-year
period of parole ineligibility to ten years, rejecting the trial judge's characterization of the
victim as particularly vulnerable:
While everything the trial judge recites as to the cowardly and brutal nature of the conduct leading to the
victim's death is true, it falls short of depicting conduct that requires special consideration over and above
the minimum term of incarceration prescribed by the Code. Murder is a brutal concept, but it is often directed
towards a vulnerable class of society. It is for this reason that Parliament has seen fit to provide for a
minimum term of incarceration.
7 8
75 See text accompanying supra note 66.
76 This is acknowledged in the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Doyle (1991), 108 N.S.R.
(2d) I (C.A.) [Doyle].
77 R. v. Pabani (1994), 17 O.R. (3d) 659 (C.A.) [Pabani].
78 Ibid. at 671.
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In McCormack,79 the trial judge had imposed a period of 14 years parole ineligibility for
a man who murdered his wife of 25 years. The trial judge stressed the brutality of the killing,
the vulnerability of the wife, and the betrayal of trust that is involved in spousal murder. He
stated, "[i]t is that vulnerability and the betrayal of that trust which sets wife murder apart
from other forms of murder. It is itself an exceptional circumstance which justifies the
increase of the period of parole ineligibility."80 The Ontario Court of Appeal reduced the
parole ineligibility period to 12 years, holding that it was an error for the trial judge to base
an increase in parole ineligibility on the fact that the victim was the accused's spouse.8 The
Court also stated:
Spousal murder is horrible. But all murder is horrible. Parliament has not seen fit to legislate that any
particular type of murder automaticallyjustifies the increase ofparole ineligibility beyond the basic ten years
contemplated by [s. 745.4]. If any specific type of murder is automatically to call for an increase in parole
ineligibility that is something which can only be legislated by Parliament.
82
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal was a lone voice in rejecting this attitude beginning with
two cases in the early 1990s. In 1991, in Doyle, 3 that Court increased the parole ineligibility
period from the ten years set by the trial judge to 17 years for a man who shot his wife as she
slept in their bed. The Court stressed that the spousal nature of the homicide was aggravating
and should lead to parole ineligibility in the upper range.84 The Court explicitly recognized
the serious societal problem of violence against women and the courts' previously
insufficient response to such violence. The fact that Parliament had not singled out spousal
homicides did not preclude it from being an aggravating factor:
Although Parliament has not singled out wives for special protection, sentencing jurisprudence recognizes
that courts attach significance to the relationship between the perpetrator of an offence and the victim, with
special emphasis on crimes involving victims in positions of vulnerability and to whom the perpetrator is in
a position of trust. With respect, it is wrong to say that one cannot consider as an aggravating factor the
spousal nature of this murder simply because Parliament did not specifically say it should be done. The
husband/wife relationship in this case is of great importance, and is a factor to be taken into account in
moving towards the upper end of the range of parole ineligibility. Family and spousal violence are all too
prevalent, and if courts have not sufficiently shown their stem disapproval of such conduct the time has now
come to do so.
85
79 R. v. McCormack (1995), 83 O.A.C. 73, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, 24873 (8 February 1996)
[ McCormack].
so Ibid. at para. 6 [emphasis omitted].81 Ibid. at para. 8.
82 Ibid. See also Muir, supra note 38 where the Court of Appeal also reduced a 12-year period of parole
ineligibility to ten years on the basis that there was no justification for increasing parole ineligibility
above the minimum.83 Supra note 76.
84 The trial judge in Doyle, ibid, by contrast, did not consider the spousal nature of the crime an
aggravating factor but focused on the lack of brutality involved in shooting a sleeping wife: "Can we
say that any time a wife is shot and killed that the penalty should be extended so the eligibility for parole
is longer. The answer has to be no, not because wives don't have a special position in society and not
because wives are not protected, but because if that were the law, then Parliament would have said so
and not created the section that they did" (at para. 38, cited in Teresa Scassa, "Sentencing Intimate
Femicide: A Comment on R. v. Doyle" (1993) 16 Dal. L.J. 270 at 279).
85 Doyle, ibid. at para. 39.
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The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal followed this case with Baillie,6 where it raised a 13-year
parole ineligibility period to 17 years. The accused in Baillie had abused his wife over a 24-
year marriage and their children were in the house at the time of the homicide.
Parliament resolved this discrepancy by enacting s. 718.2 of the Criminal Code in 1996
as part of a major codification of sentencing principles. This provision sets out various
aggravating factors in sentencing across all offences. Specifically, the existence of a spousal
relationship between the accused and the victim as well as a breach of trust in relation to the
victim are now statutorily mandated aggravating factors in sentencing for all crimes.8 7
The Supreme Court of Canada has held that s. 718.2 only applies to cases where
sentencing took place after the enactment of the provision.88 However, in Stone, 9 the Court
also held that there was common law authority to treat the spousal nature of the homicide as
aggravating, stating that "there is ample authority for the proposition that courts considered
a special connection between offender and victim to be an aggravating factor in sentencing
at common law."9 However, prior to Stone, courts were not consistently applying this
principle.
Another significant development in the second degree sentencing context was the Supreme
Court of Canada's 1995 decision in Shropshire. While not a spousal case, the Court held that
extraordinary circumstances were not necessary to justify raising parole ineligibility over ten
years. The trial judge in Shropshire raised the parole ineligibility period to 12 years in part
because the accused would not indicate his reasons for the killing. The Supreme Court of
Canada upheld the parole ineligibility period and gave judges more discretion to raise that
period. For the Court, lacobucci J. held that special circumstances were not necessary to
justify elevating the period of parole ineligibility and that the power to raise "parole
ineligibility need not be sparingly used."91
The Court held that the "unusual circumstances" test for raising parole ineligibility was
"too high a standard and makes it overly difficult for trial judges to exercise the discretionary
power to set extended periods of parole ineligibility."92 Rather, trial judges are instructed to
apply the test as follows:
6 R. v. Baillie (1991), 107 N.S.R. (2d) 256 (S.C. (A.D.)) [Baillie].
87 Criminal Code, supra note 19, s. 718.2 provides:
A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles:
(a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or
mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender, and, without limiting the
generality of the foregoing,
(ii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused the offender's spouse or
common-law partner,
(iii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a position of trust or
authority in relation to the victim,
shall be deemed to be aggravating circumstances.
88 Stone, supra note 32.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid. at para. 241 [footnotes omitted].
91 Shropshire, supra note 21 at para. 3 1.
9- lbid at para. 26.
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[Als a general rule, the period of parole ineligibility shall be for 10 years, but this can be ousted by a
deternlination of the trial judge that, according to the criteria enumerated in s. 744, the offender should wait
a longer period before having his suitability to be released into the general public assessed. To this end, an
extension of the period of parole ineligibility would not be "unusual", although it may well be that, in the
median number of cases, a period of 10 years might still be awarded.
93
The other important aspect of the Court'sjudgment in Shropshire relates to the appropriate
standard of appellate review. An appellate court should not substitute its own view of the
appropriate period of parole ineligibility. Rather, deference should be shown to the trial
judge's decision on parole ineligibility unless the trial judge applied the wrong principles or
the period imposed is manifestly unfit.
Shropshire applies to all second degree murders, not just to spousal murders. Thus, one
must be cautious in attributing any increase in sentencing for spousal murders to a change
in attitudes about violence against women in particular. It is likely that Shropshire has led
to an increase in parole ineligibility across the board for second degree murder. It is also
difficult to separate the impact of s. 718.2 from that of Shropshire because both
developments took place so close in time.94 However, because s. 718.2 applies to
manslaughter one would expect to see a corresponding increase in sentencing for that crime
if the legislation is having a significant impact.
The present sample has sentencing information from 88 second degree murder cases. The
range of parole ineligibility periods is from ten to 25 years. There are only two cases where
25-year parole ineligibility periods were imposed by the sentencing judge; in both of those
cases the periods were reduced on appeal.95 There was one additional 25-year parole
ineligibility period imposed based on s. 745(b) ofthe Criminal Code because the accused had
a previous murder conviction.96 The average parole ineligibility period for the entire sample
is 13.4 years. However, a closer look at the data suggests a change in the pattern of
sentencing over the years covered in this study. For ease of discussion, the article divides the
cases into three time periods: those in the five years prior to Shropshire, those in the five
years immediately after the decision, and those in the final seven years of the study.
93 Ibid. at para. 27.
9 Shropshire, ibid., was handed down on 16 November 1995 and s. 718.2 was enacted on 3 September
1996.
95 R. v. Sarao (1995), 80 O.A.C. 236 [Sarao]; Poissant c. R., 2007 QCCA 205, [2007] J.Q. no 998 (QL)
[Poissant].
96 R. v. Falkner, 2004 BCSC 986, 122 C.R.R. (2d) 241 [Falkner].
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TABLE 2
PAROLE INELIGIBILITY FOR SECOND DEGREE MURDER
Parole 10 years 11-15 years > 15 years Average parole I # sentence varied Total
ineligibility ineligibility6 on appeal
1990-1995 12(57%) 5(24%) 4(19%) 12.5 years 7(33%) 21
(11.7)*
1995-2000 2(7%) 17(65%) 7(27%) 14.3 years 2(7.7%) 26
(14)*
2001-June 7(17%) 25(61%) 9(21%) 13.25 years 2(4.9%) 41
2008 (12.2)*
Where there is an appeal from sentence, it is the final sentence imposed by the appellate court that was used
for these calculations.
'Average sentence after excluding multiple murders.
1. PRE-SHROPSHIRE SECOND DEGREE MURDER
SENTENCING CASES: 1990-19969'
In the early cases before Shropshire, raising the period of parole ineligibility appears to
have been the exception rather than the norm. Shropshire was decided 16 November 1995.
In the present sample, there are 21 cases in the five years immediately preceding Shropshire
where the sentence for second degree murder is available. In 12 of those 21 cases (57
percent), the minimum parole ineligibility often years was imposed. In the remaining nine
cases (43 percent), parole ineligibility was raised. In both Doyle and Baillie,9 8 the Nova
Scotia appellate court raised the parole ineligibility to 17 years, significantly increasing the
average period of parole ineligibility in the pre-Shropshire period.99 There were five cases
in which a defence appeal resulted in a reduction of parole ineligibility. All of these cases
were in Ontario, ' raising the spectre of sentencing disparity across provinces, particularly
between Ontario and Nova Scotia. The average parole ineligibility period of the pre-
Shropshire cases is 12.5 years. If the two cases involving multiple victims'0 ' are removed
from the sample, the average parole ineligibility period drops to 11.7 years. Factors that lead
to a higher period of parole ineligibility include multiple victims,' °2 a history of domestic
abuse, 03 and the presence of children in the house at the time of the killing." 4
97 See Appendix I for a table setting out the period of parole ineligibility imposed in the cases five years
immediately before Shropshire.
98 The trial judge had set parole ineligibility at ten years in Doyle, supra note 76 and at 13 years in Baillie,
supra note 86.
99 Without these two cases the average would have been 12 years.
too SeeR. v. McMurrer (1991), 89 Nfd. & P.E.I.R. 36 (P.E.I.S.C. (A.D.)) where a period often years was
raised on appeal to 12 years. In both Pabani, supra note 77 and Muir, supra note 38, ineligibility was
reduced from 12 to ten years. In McCormack, supra note 79, parole ineligibility was reduced from 14
to 12 years and in Sarao, supra note 95 from 25 to 22 years. It should be noted that Sarao involved the
murder of three people, the accused's spouse and her parents.
"0 In Sarao, ibid., 22 years of parole ineligibility was imposed and in R. v. Loubier, [1995] O.J. No. 2035
(Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) (QL) [Loubier] a 17-year parole ineligibility period was imposed.
102 Loubier, ibid. and Sarao, ibid..
103 See e.g. Baillie, supra note 86; McCormack, supra note 79; R. v. Munroe (1995),79 O.A.C. 41; see also
R. v. Randhawa (1990), 104 A.R. 304 (C.A.) [Randhawa]; Pabani, supra note 77.
104 See e.g. Randhawa, ibid.; Baillie, ibid.; R. v. Morrow, [1995] O.J. No. 4052 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) (QL).
In Randhawa, the accused's grown daughter was involved in the confrontation but, unlike her mother,
managed to escape.
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2. POST-SHROPSHIRE SECOND DEGREE MURDER
SENTENCING CASES: 1996-20005
The picture painted by the cases immediately after Shropshire is different. In this sample,
26 cases were decided in the five years after Shropshire. The ten-year minimum parole
ineligibility period was imposed in only two cases (7 percent).0 6 The remaining 24 cases
involved an increase in the parole ineligibility period. The average parole ineligibility period
imposed in these 26 cases is 14.3 years. As with the earlier group of cases, two cases
involved multiple homicides. In D.B. , the accused killed his former spouse and her parents
while in Ullah,'° the accused killed his wife and three-year-old son. If one excludes the two
cases involving multiple homicides'0 9 the average period of parole ineligibility decreases to
14 years.
As mentioned, it is difficult to attribute this increase to attitudes about spousal homicides
given that Shropshire may have elevated parole ineligibility across the board for second
degree murder. There is some evidence of this from a British Columbia Court of Appeal
decision. In Paterson," 10 a second degree murder case involving an accused who killed his
former same-sex partner, Lambert J. of the British Columbia Court of Appeal demonstrated
that parole ineligibility imposed for second degree murder had increased, at least in British
Columbia, post-Shropshire. His findings were summarized as follows:
I have endeavoured to find all of the British Columbia cases of second degree murder where the final
sentence (at trial, or in this Court) was imposed in the five years before the 1995 decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada in Shropshire. I have found eighteen cases. In eight of those cases (44%) the period of
parole ineligibility was set at ten years. The average length of the period of parole ineligibility was 12.9
years. The median period was 13 years.
I have made the same search for all the British Columbia cases of second degree murder where the final
sentence, (at trial or in this Court) was imposed in the five years after the 1995 decision of the Supreme Court
of Canada in Shropshire. I have found 23 cases. In only four of those cases (17.4%) was the period of parole
ineligibility set at ten years. The average length of the period of parole ineligibility has risen to 15.2 years.
The median period was 15 years.III
Comparing the results of the present study to those cited by Lambert J., one can see that
the minimum period of parole ineligibility was imposed in a greater percentage of spousal
cases from the pre-Shropshire time period than was the case for non-spousal homicides (58
percent versus 44 percent). Furthermore, a higher percentage of the post-Shropshire spousal
105 See Appendix 2 for a table setting out the period of parole ineligibility imposed in the cases five years
immediately after Shropshire.
106 R. c. Coutu, [1999] J.Q. no 1809 (C.S.) (QL) [Coutu]; R. v. Krugel (2000), 129 O.A.C. 182 [Krugel].
Coutu involved the accused hiring a killer to kill his wife. The Crown and defence made a joint
submission recommending the minimum parole ineligibility period. The accused had no criminal record
or prior history of violence. Reasons for sentence for Krugel are not available.
107 R. v. D.B., [1996] B.C.J. No. 1485 (S.C.) (QL) [D.B.]. The accused received 20 years of parole
ineligibility, which was upheld on appeal.
108 R. v. Ullah, [1999] O.J. No. 2767 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL) [Ullah]. The accused received the period of parole
ineligibility of 15 years.
109 D.B., supra note 107; Ulah, ibid.
1o R. v. Paterson, 2001 BCCA 11, 149 B.C.A.C. 56 [Paterson].
I Ibid. at paras. 23-24 [emphasis omitted].
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cases in this sample elevated the minimum period of parole ineligibility than in the British
Columbia sample (93 percent versus 83 percent). The British Columbia average period of
parole ineligibility, which includes all second degree murders, is higher than the average in
this sample. Thus, a greater degree of change appears to have occurred in the spousal
homicide cases than in second degree cases generally, with fewer early cases elevating the
parole ineligibility period and more later cases doing so.
While the norm used to be the minimum ten years of parole ineligibility for spousal
homicides, that has changed such that a period often years of parole ineligibility is now the
exception. One must be cautious about comparing national data to data from one province.
However, to the extent that it is representative, the British Columbia data suggests that the
increase in cases elevating the parole ineligibility period for spousal second degree murders
is greater than for second degree murders generally. The average sentence in this sample
remains slightly below the British Columbia average, thus suggesting that Shropshire may
not be the only factor at play.
One of the most influential of the post-Shropshire appellate cases, which would go on to
shape the setting of the parole ineligibility period, particularly in Ontario, was McKnight."2
In this case, the trial judge imposed a parole ineligibility period of 17 years after the accused
stabbed his wife in a brutal attack, which resulted in over 50 defensive wounds alone. The
accused had a long history of major depression and related mental health issues and had
attempted to kill his wife on an earlier occasion. He argued unsuccessfully that he should be
found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder, but the jury convicted him of
second degree murder (despite a period before the killing during which he contemplated
killing his wife). While citing Shropshire and the importance of appellate deference, a
majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal held that 17 years was outside the acceptable range
and suggested that, in all but exceptional cases, "similar cases from this province of brutal
second-degree murders of an unarmed wife or girlfriend suggest a range of 12 to 15 years."l 3
The Court held that this case should be towards the higher end of that range and set the
parole ineligibility period at 14 years. This case is cited in virtually all the subsequent
Ontario cases and in some cases from other provinces as well." 4 The biggest increase after
Shropshire is in those sentenced to parole ineligibility of 11 to 15 years, almost identical to
the range identified in McKnight (see Table 2, above). Thus, while the parole ineligibility
period is consistently raised above ten years post-Shropshire, at least one appellate court is
attempting to limit the degree to which these sentences are elevated and to set some
guidelines for trial judges." 5
112 R. v. McKnight(1999),44 O.R. (3d) 263 (C.A.) [McKnight]. Although the trial in McKnight took place
prior to Shropshire, supra note 21, the appellate Court applied Shropshire in reducing the period of
parole ineligibility.
113 McKnight, ibid. at para. 47.
114 See e.g. R. v. Oigg, 2006 MBQB 68,202 Man. R. (2d) 219 [Oigg]; R. v. Legge, 2005 NLTD 156,250
Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 235.
115 There are exceptions to raising the parole ineligibility period. Seee.g. R. v. Diep,2005 ABQB 81,[2005]
A.J. No. 106 (QL) [Diep], where the trial judge dismissed a Crown application to raise the period of
parole ineligibility above ten years and held that the fact that the killing was a spousal homicide is not
in itselfjustification for increasing parole ineligibility.
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3. POST-SHROPSHIRE SECOND DEGREE MURDER
SENTENCING CASES: 2001-2008I6
In the final time period under study (2001 to June 2008), the courts appear to have settled
into what one would call a range of parole ineligibility, although there are still differences
among provinces. There were 41 cases for which we have sentencing information during this
period. Of those 41, only seven (17 percent) impose the minimum parole ineligibility period.
Although this is an increase from the immediate post-Shropshire cases, it remains lower than
in the pre-Shropshire period. Of these seven cases, four were in British Columbia," 7 one in
Ontario, ' one in Quebec," 9 and one in Alberta.' In four of these cases, including three of
the four British Columbia cases, the Crown did not request an increase in the parole
ineligibility period. This suggests that Crown counsel did not see these cases as particularly
egregious.' 2' Twenty-five of the 41 cases (61 percent) fell in the range of I 1 to 15 years of
parole ineligibility, with 23 (56 percent) falling in the 12- to 15-year range described by the
Ontario Court of Appeal in McKnight as the appropriate range of parole ineligibility absent
unusual circumstances for intimate homicide. The Quebec Court of Appeal has also referred
to a range from ten to 15 years.
22
In nine of the 41 cases (22 percent) during this period, the parole ineligibility period was
raised above 15 years.123 In one ofthe cases, 124 the accused had a previous murder conviction,
thus, there was a mandatory 25-year parole ineligibility period pursuant to s. 745(b) of the
Criminal Code. Despite the range set out in McKnight, the Ontario Court of Appeal has been
willing to uphold periods of parole ineligibility greater than 15 years. For example, in R. v.
Czibulka,2 5 the accused was given a parole ineligibility period of 17 years based on the
brutality of the murder and his history of spousal abuse. In Wristen, 126 the Court upheld
parole ineligibility of 17 years in a case where the body of the victim was never found and
the accused continued to deny involvement in her death. The history of spousal abuse, the
refusal to disclose where the victim's body was located, and the spousal nature of the killing
were all considered aggravating factors. The Ontario Court of Appeal has held, however, that
a trial judge wishing to exceed the period of parole ineligibility set in McKnight must provide
clear reasons for departing from that range.
127
116 See Appendix 3 for a table setting out the period of parole ineligibility imposed in the cases decided
between 2001-2008.
'7 R. v. D. W.M., 2005 BCSC 1061, [2005] B.C.J. No. 1578 (QL) [D. W.M.]; R. v. Taylor, 2007 BCSC 390,
[2007] B.C.J. No. 593 (QL) [Taylor]; Curry, supra note 37; R. v. Waraich, 2008 BCSC 919, [2008]
B.C.J. No. 1309 (QL) [Waraich].
's R. v. Guiboche, 2004 MBCA 16, 180 Man. R. (2d) 276.
H9 R. c. Picard, [2004] J.Q. no 4332 (C.S.) (QL) [Picard].
12 Diep, supra note 115.
121 D.W.M., supra note 117; Taylor, supra note 117; Curry, supra note 37; Waraich, supra note 117;
Picard, supra note 119.
122 Poissant, supra note 95.
123 R. v. Czibulka, [200 1] O.J. No.6115 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL); R. v. Johnson, 2001 NSSC 119,196 N.S.R. (2d)
267 [Johnson]; R. v. Teske, [2001] O.3. No. 1900 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL) [Teske]; R. v. Kianipour, 2003
BCCA 703, 192 B.C.A.C. 220 [Kianipour]; R. v. K. W.M (Machell), 2003 BCCA 688, 190 B.C.A.C. 294
[Machell]; Falkner, supra note 96; Poissant, ibid.; R. v. J. V., [2006] O.J. No. 2392 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL);
R. v. White, 2006 ABQB 909,408 A.R. 64.
124 Falkner, ibid.
s25 (2004), 190 O.A.C. 1. The Ontario Court of Appeal ordered a new trial in this case on other grounds.
26 R. v. Wristen (1999), 47 O.R. (3d) 66 (C.A.) [Wristen].
127 SeeR. v. Teske(2005),202 O.A.C. 239 where the Ontario Court of Appeal reduced to 13 years a 16-year
period of parole ineligibility set by the trial judge.
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Four of the nine cases in this period involved multiple murders. In Johnson,'28 the accused
received a period of parole ineligibility of 21 years for killing his common-law spouse and
her two-month-old daughter. Kianipour129 and Machell30 both resulted in parole ineligibility
of 20 years. In Kianipour, the accused killed his estranged wife and her parents. His two
young children witnessed the murder of their grandparents. The accused also had a long
history of spousal abuse. In Machell, the accused killed his wife and his mother-in-law in
front of his two small children. In R. c. MP., 3 the trial judge imposed the maximum 25
years of parole ineligibility for four counts of second degree murder (his spouse, two of her
children, and one of their friends) and one count of attempted murder with respect to a friend
who was able to escape. The Quebec Court of Appeal reduced this to 15 years parole
ineligibility without a very satisfactory explanation other than to indicate that there was no
precedent for imposing 25 years parole ineligibility. 32 Thus, while killing more than one
person is an aggravating factor, it does not necessarily lead to periods of parole ineligibility
close to the maximum 25 years.
Similar reasons are given for raising the parole ineligibility period in the pre- and post-
Shropshire period. These include: more than one victim,'33 brutality,'34 a history of violence
towards the victim or towards another spouse,'35 evidence of planning and deliberation,'36
breach of a restraining order,'37 high risk of reoffending,138 attempts to cover up the killing
and to deny involvement,'39 and the presence of children in the house at the time of the
killing. 4 ° The absence of a history of violence is a significant mitigating factor and may in
some cases lead to a parole ineligibility not being raised above ten years. 4'
:28 Supra note 123.
29 Supra note 123.
130 Supra note 123.
'3' [2004] J.Q. no 8702 (C.S.) (QL).32 Poissant, supra note 95.
133 Ullah, supra note 108; D.B., supra note 107.
134 R. v. Sodhi (2003), 66 O.R. (3d) 641 (C.A.) [Sodhi]; R. c. Dagenais, [2004] J.Q. no 12142 (C.S.) (QL)
[Dagenais]; R. v. Nichols, [2006] 0.J. No. 2868 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL); Oigg, supra note 114; R. c. Morin-
Cousineau, 2006 QCCS 2289, [2006] J.Q. no 3872 (QL) [Morin-Cousineau]; R. v. VanEindhoven, 2007
NUCJ 2, [2007] Nu.J. No. 2 (QL) [VanEindhoven]; R. v. Bajrangie-Singh (2003), 170 O.A.C. 99; R. v.
Beamish (1996), 144 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 357 (P.E.I. S.C. (T.D.)) [Beamish]; R. v. Stewner (1996), 113
Man. R. (2d) 78 (C.A.) [Stewner]; R. c. Artesen, [1997] J.Q. no 1845 (C.S.) (QL) [Artesen]; R. v. Assoun
(1999), 182 N.S.R. (2d) 344 (S.C.) [Assoun]; McKnight, supra note 112; R. v. Gray, [2000] 0.1. No.
5317 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL) [Gray]; R. v. G.W.F., 2000 BCSC 508, [2000] B.C.J. No. 1853 (QL); R. v.
Ogden (2000), 187 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 134 (Nfld. S.C.) [Ogden].
135 See e.g. R. c. Bolduc, [2001] J.Q. no 1532 (C.S.) (QL); R. v. Peterffy, 2001 BCCA 698, 162 B.C.A.C.
24 [Peterffy]; Teske, supra note 123; R. c. Daigle, [2004] J.Q. no 13829 (C.S.) (QL); R. v. Moo, [2004]
O.J. No. 2234 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL); R. v. Howard, [2006] O.J. No. 1350 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL) [Howard]; R.
v. Labidi, [2006] O.J. No. 3138 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL) [Labidi]; Oigg, ibid; VanEindhoven, ibid; Beamish,
ibid.; Stewner, ibid.; R. v. Parmar, [1997] O.J. No. 3302 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) (QL); R. c. R.P., [1997] J.Q.
no 279 (C.S.) (QL); R. v. Cross (1998), 171 N.S.R. (2d) 56 (S.C.); Assoun, ibid; R. v. Stewart, [1999]
N.B.J. No. 415 (Q.B.) (QL); R. v. Stephen, 1999 ABCA 190, 244 A.R. 372; Wristen, supra note 126;
Ogden, ibid.
136 Dagenais, supra note 134; R. v. Lenius, 2007 SKCA 65,299 Sask. R. 139 [Lenius]; R. v. Neumann, 2005
BCSC 1820, [2005] B.C.J. No. 2883 (S.C.) (QL); R. c, Rizzolo, [2005] J.Q. no 19927 (C.S.) (QL);
Labidi, ibid.
137 Howard, supra note 135; VanEindhoven, supra note 134.
138 R. c. Parent, [2001] J.Q. no 6833 (C.S.) (QL) [Parent]; Peterffy, supra note 135; Oigg, supra note 114;
Morin-Cousineau, supra note 134.
139 See e.g. Sodhi, supra note 134; Wristen, supra note 126; Teske, supra note 123.
140 See R. v. Savoie (1998), 209 N.B.R. (2d) 378 (Q.B.); R. v. Rushton, [1999] Y.J. No. 62 (S.C.) (QL);
Ogden, supra note 134; Howard, supra note 135; Lenius, supra note 136.
141 See e.g.D.W.M,supra note 117.
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The Supreme Court of Canada also held in Shropshire that appellate courts should be
hesitant in interfering with the trial judge's determination of the appropriate sentence unless
there has been a specific error in principle and the sentence is clearly unreasonable. 4 This
change is reflected in the cases. In the pre-Shropshire cases, an appellate court interfered
with parole eligibility in seven of 21 cases (33 percent). In the five years after Shropshire,
there are only two cases (7.7 percent) in which a Court of Appeal interfered with the parole
ineligibility period set by a lower court. During the final time period under study only two
(5 percent) of the cases were altered on appeal, both sentences being reduced by the Court
of Appeal. 1
4 3
Almost all of the cases occurring after 1996 refer to s. 718.2(a)(ii), which makes it an
aggravating factor that the victim was the offender's spouse. Some refer to s. 718.2(a)(iii),
which makes the abuse of a position of trust or authority aggravating. On reading the cases,
one is left with the impression that both Shropshire and the amendments (and the changing
social values they reflect) are at play. Judges and courts of appeal are definitely more willing
to raise the period of parole ineligibility over ten years after Shropshire. But the attitude
towards spousal homicide in particular, as reflected in the caseshas also changed. The clear
legislative statement that the spousal nature of the crime is an aggravating factor gives the
courts a specific reason for raising the parole ineligibility period in the spousal context.
The data suggest that sentences for spousal second degree murder peaked in the period
immediately following Shropshire and levelled off in the 2001-2008 time period, albeit, at
a level still higher than that prior to Shropshire.
D. MANSLAUGHTER
This sample has a total of 58 manslaughter cases for which the sentence is available.
Manslaughter has a wider sentencing range than either form of murder. There is no minimum
sentence, except where a firearm is used.'" The maximum sentence is life imprisonment.
This sample had only two suspended sentences'45 and two life sentences.'46
The sentencing cases reveal that the difference between a murder conviction and a
conviction for manslaughter is very significant in terms of how long an offender is going to
be incarcerated. The average sentence for manslaughter in this sample was 8.6 years, with
typical parole eligibility after serving two-thirds of a sentence. There were no manslaughter
sentencing cases in this sample where a period of parole ineligibility was imposed pursuant
to s. 743.6(1). By contrast, for second degree murder the average is a parole ineligibility
period of more than 13 years.
142 Shropshire, supra note 21 at para. 46. See also R. v. Pepin (1990), 98 N.S.R. (2d) 238 at 251 (S.C.
(A.D.)).
143 Lenius, supra note 136; Teske, supra note 123.
144 Where a firearm is used, the minimum sentence is four years imprisonment: see Criminal Code, supra
note 19, s. 236.
14 R. v. Shorty, [ 1993] Y.J. No. 101 (S.C.) (QL) [Shorty]; R. c. Jenkins (1993), 57 Q.A.C. 5 [Jenkins].
14 R. v. Zagorac (1997), 200 A.R. 305 (C.A.) [Zagorac]; R. v. Montgrand, 2007 SKCA 102, 304 Sask. R.
150.
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It is sometimes difficult to determine the precise reason a jury has reduced a charge of
murder to a conviction for manslaughter, be it intoxication, a lack of mens rea, provocation,
or simply the jury's sense of what verdict is most just. Similarly, it is difficult to speculate
on the reasons for Crown counsel accepting a guilty plea to manslaughter where the original
charge was second degree murder. Intoxication and provocation account for some, but not
all, of the accepted guilty pleas.
In the previous section, the article outlined changes to the law of spousal homicide for
sentencing for second degree murder and examined the impact of Shropshire and s. 718.2.
Shropshire is only relevant to manslaughter for the standard of appellate review whereas
s. 718.2 does apply to manslaughter sentencing. Thus, if judges are meting out higher
sentences because of s. 718.2, one would expect the same pattern for manslaughter
sentencing. If no change is evident, then one could more easily attribute the change in second
degree murder sentencing primarily to Shropshire.
The data in this study reveal that there has been an increase in sentencing severity for








Pre-amendment 1990-96 22 7.1 years* 5 (23%) 8(36%) 6(27%) 3(13.6%)
Post-amendment 1996-2002 14 7.9 years 2(14%) 3(21%) 9(60%) 1(7%)
Post amendment 2002-June 2008 22 10.6 years* 3 (13.6%) 1 (4.5%) 10(45.5%) 8(36%)
§ Where there is an appeal from sentence, it is the final sentence imposed by the appellate court that was used
for these calculations.
*Each of these periods had one life sentence, which was excluded from the calculation of the average
sentence but included in the rest of the data. Thus the average for each of these periods is slightly
understated.
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1. PRE-S. 718.2 SPOUSAL MANSLAUGHTER
SENTENCING CASES: 1990-19961
4 1
For the 22 cases that were sentenced between 1990 and 1996, prior to the Criminal Code
amendments, the average sentence imposed was 7.1 years. 148 In 59 percent of the cases, the
sentence was seven years or less.
The cases ranged from a suspended sentence 49 to life imprisonment. 50 A suspended
sentence was given to a 90-year-old alcoholic who accidentally shot his wife while they were
both drinking.' 5 ' The other suspended sentence was imposed in Jenkins,' where the crime
was described as completely out of character and there was psychiatric evidence that the
accused was in a dissociative state at the time of the killing. In both cases the accused
pleaded guilty to manslaughter. The life sentence was imposed in a case where there had
been a long history of spousal abuse and a previous conviction of assault against the
accused's former spouse.'53
In 23 percent of cases, a sentence of less than five years was imposed.'54 For example, in
Archibald,' where there was evidence of both provocation and intoxication, the trial judge
imposed a sentence of five years for manslaughter. However, the Court of Appeal reduced
it to four years (in part because the accused was engaged to marry a doctor by the time of the
appeal). In Strong,'56 the accused killed his common-law wife while both were intoxicated.
Mr. Strong was sentenced to 30 months imprisonment. Both of these cases involved
provocation defences.
A sentence of more than ten years was given in only three cases (13.6 percent).' 57 In
Calladine,55 for example, the accused had an extensive criminal record (although mainly for
non-violent offences) and the judge seemed primarily concerned with general deterrence. 5 9
In this early period, there were some comments made about the range of sentences for
spousal manslaughter. In R. v. Zimmer,16 the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal stated that from
1965-1980, sentences in the range of three to five years were common but that, more
recently, seven- and eight-year sentences had been appearing. The reason given was that "the
147 See Appendix 4 for a table setting out manslaughter sentencing cases that were decided between 1990-
1996.
148 The average is slightly understated because the life sentence was excluded from the calculation: see
Zagorac, supra note 146. The two suspended sentences were counted as zero years of imprisonment for
the purposes of calculating the average sentence.
149 Shorty, supra note 145.
1s Zagorac, supra note 146.
151 Shorty, supra note 145.
152 Supra note 145.
153 Zagorac, supra note 146.
154 R. v. Archibald(1992), 15 B.C.A.C. 301 [Archibald];Jenkins, supra note 145; Shorty, supra note 145;
R. v. Lastheels, [1994] O.J. No. 1181 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) (QL); R. v. Strong, [1996] O.J. No. 3558 (Ct.
J. (Gen. Div.)) (QL) [Strong].
155 Archibald, ibid
156 Strong, supra note 154, actually involved a guilty plea to manslaughter but it was clear from the trial
judge's decision that the plea was accepted on the basis of a defence of provocation.
157 R. v. Calladine, [1993] O.J. No. 1637 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.))(QL) [Calladine];R. v. Wedel(1993),88 Man.
R. (2d) 115 (C.A.) [Wedel]; R. v. Lemay (1998), 127 C.C.C. (3d) 528 (Qc. C.A.).
1ss Calladine, ibid.
159 See also Wedel, supra note 157.
160 [1990] S.J. No. 654 (C.A.) (QL.).
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judiciary in the Province, concerned about the frequency with which this crime is occurring
has responded by gradually laying more emphasis on general deterrence, and hence
broadening the range of sentencing for this offence in an effort to provide a greater measure
of protection for society."'
6
'1
In Archibald, the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that the range at that time was
from a suspended sentence to something less than eight years. Thus, we can see in the early
manslaughter sentencing cases spousal manslaughters were treated as among the less serious
types of manslaughter.
Perhaps the most striking finding about the early cases is the lack of reference to the fact
that the victim was the accused's intimate partner as an aggravating factor. The breach of
trust involved in such killings was only occasionally mentioned and sentencing proceeded
as it would for any other manslaughter case. In one of the few sentencing cases where the
trial judge did note the seriousness of domestic violence, the accused appealed his five-year
sentence in part on the basis that the trial judge was wrong to emphasize the domestic
violence aspect of the case.'62 The British Columbia Court of Appeal dealt with the issue
very briefly stating simply that the domestic violence was one aspect of the crime that should
be considered. A few courts did acknowledge the relevance of the spousal nature of the
killing but only as one of many factors. In Williams,'63 the British Columbia Court of Appeal
upheld the sentence imposed at trial, saying:
I do not consider that the sentencing judge gave an incorrect emphasis to domestic violence. The domestic
aspect of this matter was one of the factors involved in the case and ought to have been taken into account
as a circumstance of the crime by the sentencing judge. I do not think that she gave it an unwarranted
significance. 164
In Jackson,"6 s the Crown sought a life sentence on appeal. In differentiating Jackson from
another apparently more serious manslaughter case where a life sentence was imposed, the
majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal noted that the other case involved a victim chosen
at random unlike Jackson, which involved a spousal killing, thus implying that spousal
killings are less serious than stranger killings. The dissent highlighted the problematic nature
of this reasoning: "I do not think that it makes the murder by Nienhuis any more brutal or of
'stark horror' than the killing of his common-law wife by Jackson as a result of his stabbing
her 59 times with a pocket knife and kitchen knife when a 4 year old child was in the
house."'
166
In Jackson, the majority did acknowledge that the breach of trust involved in a spousal
homicide is an aggravating factor, but held that the relationship between the parties
161 Ibid. at para. 31.
162 R. v. Williams (G.M.) (1995), 61 B.C.A.C. 6 [ Williams]. The British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld
the five-year sentence.
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid. at para. 6.
165 Supra note 24.
66 Ibid. at para. 33.
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could hardly have been far from [the trial judge's] mind when he imposed sentence.... Although the trial
judge did not specifically refer in his reasons to the "breach of trust" ... he indicated quite clearly that he was
aware that the victim stood in a special relationship to the respondent and that this was an aggravating
factor.
167
By contrast, in Gray,16 the spousal nature of the killing was treated as a key factor in the
sentencing of the offender. The Court acknowledged that deterrence is particularly important
for spousal manslaughters. In Klassen,6 9 the Yukon Territory Court of Appeal rejected the
Crown argument that a special range of sentences should be imposed for spousal
manslaughters. Thus, the pre-s. 718.2 spousal manslaughter cases demonstrate, at best,
inconsistent support for the idea that spousal manslaughters should attract a more serious
sentence.
The 1996 enactment of s. 718.2 of the Criminal Code and the Supreme Court of Canada's
decision in Stone may have signalled a turning point in the sentencing of spousal
manslaughters. In Stone, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that there is "ample
authority for the proposition that courts considered a spousal connection between offender
and victim to be an aggravating factor in sentencing at common law."' 7 ° However, despite
holding that the spousal relationship was an aggravating factor in Stone, the Court upheld a
seven-year sentence for an accused who stabbed his wife 47 times. The Court resisted the
suggestion that it should set a range for provoked spousal manslaughters and instead showed
considerable deference to the trial judge even though the Court itself would have been
inclined to impose a slightly more onerous sentence. After Stone, and, in particular the
enactment of s. 718.2(a)(ii), there is a clear trend in sentencing decisions towards recognizing
the breach of trust involved in spousal manslaughters.
2. POST-S. 718.2 SPOUSAL MANSLAUGHTER
SENTENCING CASES: 1996-20021''
To aid comparison, the post-amendment manslaughter sentencing cases have been divided
into two chronological periods as was done with second degree murder. The first time period
includes the six years immediately following in the amendments and the second the last six
years of the study.
The average sentence of 7.9 years for this post-amendment time period is somewhat
higher than the initial period's average of 7.1 years. Part of this increase could be attributed
to the exclusion of the one life sentence from the pre-amendment period. The fact that the
earlier period had two suspended sentences also brought that average down. While there is
not a lot of change in the average sentence, there is a change in the distribution of sentences.
Prior to the amendments, 59 percent of cases received a sentence of seven years or less
whereas this number dropped to 34 percent immediately after the amendments. Similarly,
there was a large increase (from 27 percent to 57 percent) in the percentage of cases that
167 Ibid. at para. 16.
6' Supra note 134.
69 R. v. Klassen (1997), 95 B.C.A.C. 136 (Y.C.A.) [Klassen].
705 Stone, supra note 32 at para. 241.
171 See Appendix 5 for a table setting out the manslaughter sentencing cases decided between 1996-2002.
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were sentenced to between eight and ten years. However there were actually fewer cases over
ten years in the immediate post-amendment period than there were in the initial period.
Unlike with previous cases, every case in this group referred to the spousal nature of the
homicide as an aggravating factor. In Saunders,'72 however, the Ontario Superior Court
expressed doubt about whether this aggravating factor had changed the range of sentences
appropriate for spousal manslaughters stating that the range is probably "still in the ten to 12
year range; perhaps eight to 12 year range."' 73 In Sheppard,'74 the Court held that if there was
to be an increase in the range of appropriate sentences, it was up to the Supreme Court of
Canada to so decide. Thus, while the range of sentences does seem to be increasing in this
period,' 75 one can see some reluctance on the part of judges to impose sentences over ten
years. Of the 15 cases during this period, only one sentence over ten years was upheld on
appeal. 1
76
3. POST-S. 718.2 SPOUSAL MANSLAUGHTER
SENTENCING CASES: 2002-2008177
There was a significant increase in the average sentence from the pre-amendment time
period to the final period under study, 2002-2008, which went from seven years in the former
period to 10.6 in the latter. The change can be seen most clearly in the number of accused
sentenced to a period of imprisonment greater than ten years, which was only 14 percent of
the cases prior to the amendments and 36 percent of the cases in the 2002-2008 time period.
Only 19 percent of cases received a sentence of seven years or less in this time period
compared with 59 percent of the cases in the pre-amendment period.
Looking at cases individually, some severe sentences were imposed during this time
period. In particular, the Quebec Superior Court meted out three sentences between 16 and
20 years. A 20-year sentence was imposed in Dadgar17 where the accused had previously
been incarcerated for committing a violent sexual assault against two women. The sentencing
judge, Martin J., described Mr. Dadgar as a "street-wise, clever and manipulative man," and
seemed disappointed that he was not convicted of murder at trial, given that the "homicide
... had as its hallmark a level of violence and brutality which would be difficult to
surpass.',179 The accused in Kane c. R.'80 was sentenced to 18 years in prison, also by Martin
J. of the Quebec Superior Court. Justice Martin described the manslaughter as "particularly
shocking," and noted that it was "carried out brutally and without waming."'' In his reasons
for sentence, he noted that the killing was "chillingly similar" to the one committed by the
accused in Dadgar 2 Finally, a 16.5-year sentence was imposed by Champagne J. in
Cook, ' 3 another extremely violent manslaughter that took place in the course of a sexual
172 R. v. Saunders, [2000] O.J. No. 5622 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL) [Saunders].
03 Ibid. at para. 13.
174 R. v. Sheppard, 2001 PESCTD 56, 202 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 172.
175 See e.g. R. v. MeCulloch, 2001 BCCA 196, 153 B.C.A.C. 32 where a 12-year sentence was found by
the Court of Appeal to be within the range of appropriate sentences.
176 Ibid.
177 See Appendix 6 for a table setting out the manslaughter sentencing cases decided between 2002-2008.
178 R. c. Dadgar, [2003] Q.J. No. 15818 (C.S.) (QL) [Dadgar].
179 Ibid. at paras. 5, 4.
[80 2005 QCCA 753, 202 C.C.C. (3d) 113.
'81 Ibid. at para. 20.
82 Ibid. at para. 26.
183 R. c. Cook, 2006 QCCS 3632, [2006] J.Q. no 7248 (QL) [Cook].
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assault. The accused was charged with first degree murder, but convicted of manslaughter
following a successful intoxication defence.
In the cases in this period, there is continuing recognition of domestic violence as an
aggravating factor. In R. v. Beaulne, the Ontario Superior Court cautions:
Domestic violence must, and will be, deterred in this community until hopefully it has been eradicated. Men,
and sometimes women, but not too often, must come to the realization that society will not permit violence
in a spousal relationship. Where it is found it will be severely dealt with by the Courts. That is why Mr.
Beaulne will be receiving a lengthy sentence, the equivalent of ten years in jail for the crime of
manslaughter. 1
84
In Boutilier, the same Court says, "the range of sentence for manslaughter of this nature
(that is, the sudden taking of a life with a weapon), is between ten years and 15 years
imprisonment, before taking into account any pre-trial custody."' 5
Thus, it would appear that sentences for spousal manslaughters are on the rise. Section
718.2 is regularly cited to justify the seriousness of these cases. As will be discussed in more
detail below, intoxication is generally seen as an aggravating factor while provocation tends
to lead to sentences in the lower range for spousal manslaughters. It is to these two defences
that the article now turns.
E. THE IMPACT OF THE DEFENCES OF INTOXICATION AND
PROVOCATION ON SENTENCING FOR SPOUSAL HOMICIDE
Intoxication is highly implicated in spousal homicides.' 86 Allegations of provocation are
also quite common. 87 However, the two defences operate differently. Intoxication can negate
the mens rea for murder. Provocation, on the other hand, only applies where the killing
would otherwise be murder. Thus, the trier of fact must first determine whether the elements
of murder can be established. It is only once intoxication is rejected and mens rea is
established that the trier of fact should consider provocation.'88 This is complicated by the
fact that evidence of provocation is relevant to mens rea,5 9 although anger itself cannot
negate mens rea under s. 229.'90 Intoxication, even where insufficient to negate mens rea,
may still be relevant to the subjective component of the provocation inquiry.
[2003] O.J. No. 5344 at para. 4 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL).
's5 R. v. Boutilier, [2003] O.J. No. 4515 at para. 24 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL) [Boutilier].
186 Mia Dauvergne, "Homicide in Canada, 2004" (2005) 25:6 Juristat 1.
187 See e.g. Sychuk, supra note 36; R. v. Marc (1995), 159 N.B.R. (2d) 183 (C.A.); Strong, supra note 154;
Klassen, supra note 169; R. v. Ackland, 2003 BCCA 343, 184 B.C.A.C. 85; Kent, supra note 38; R. v.
Li, 2007 ONCA 136, 221 O.A.C. 179 [Li].188 Ibid.
189 Ibid.
190 Parent, supra note 138. However, see Sanjeev Anand, "A Provocative Perspective on the Influence of
Anger on the Mens Rea for Murder: The Alberta Court of Appeal's Interpretation of Parent in Walle"
(2008) 54 Crim. L.Q. 27 (limiting Parent to s. 229(a)(i)).
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1. INTOXICATION
It is well accepted that intoxication and spousal violence are inexorably linked. A majority
of the 96 spousal homicides in 2004, for example, involved the intoxication of the victim
and/or the accused. 9' Although it is clear that there is a correlation between alcohol use and
spousal violence, studies hesitate to find a direct causal connection because "alcohol abusers
tend to have other risk factors for violence, such as low occupational status and attitudes
approving violence against women."'92
In the cases examined for this article, the defence of intoxication failed far more frequently
than it succeeded. However, the impact of intoxication on sentencing outcomes is probably
understated as it is likely that the Crown accepted guilty pleas to manslaughter in some cases
where the evidence supported an intoxication defence. Out of 252 cases examined, 65 (26
percent) mentioned that the accused was intoxicated at the time of the homicide. In many
cases the victim was also intoxicated. Out of those 65 cases, intoxication was raised as a
defence in 31 cases; in four of those 31 cases (13 percent) the defence was successful, and
in 27 (87 percent) it was rejected. 193 In the four successful cases, the accused was convicted
of manslaughter. 94 Generally, the defence was rejected by a jury, and thus no reasons were
given.
Courts look to mariy factors in determining whether intoxication has negated the mens rea
for murder. In Diep,195 for example, the Court looked to the manner of death, the accused's
post-offence conduct, the appearance of the crime scene, expert opinion, and statements to
police and third parties. The post-offence behaviour of the accused seems to be particularly
important. 9 6 If the accused behaves irrationally after the killing, intoxication is more likely
to succeed, whereas efforts to cover up the crime and other goal-directed behaviour reduce
the likelihood of success. In Tipewan, 97 for example, the accused had a blood-alcohol
concentration of 0.19 six to seven hours after the crime. 198 The Court stressed his bizarre
behaviour after the killing including remaining in his bloody clothing, drinking in the house
with the victim's body for an hour after the killing, and going outside and firing a shot into
the air. The trial judge stated:
I have to say it strikes me as unusual that a person who is not a psychopath and had an operating mind could
spend an unconcerned one half to one hour in the house with the deceased ... given the horror of the scene,
191 Dauvergne, supra note 186.
192 Measuring Violence, supra note 3.
193 See Archibald, supra note 154 where the jury either found on the basis of provocation or intoxication
and the trial judge indicated that intoxication was more likely. See also R. v. Tipewan, [1998] S.J. No.
681 (Q.B.) (QL) [Tipewan]; Saunders, supra note 172; Cook, supra note 183.
194 In R. v. Walker, [2004] S.J. No. 850 (Q.B.) (QL), rev'd 2007 SKCA 48, 293 Sask. R. 113, rev'd 2008
SCC 34, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 245, the trial judge was somewhat unclear as to whether he had a reasonable
doubt based on intoxication or accident but, in an appeal based on the insufficiency of the trial judge's
reasons, the Supreme Court of Canada held that intoxication was not the basis of the reduced verdict.
95 Supra note 115.
96 The Supreme Court of Canada stresses the importance of this factor in R. v. Lemky, [ 1996] 1 S.C.R. 757.
See also R. v. Robinson, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 683; R. v. Seymour, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 252.
19 Supra note 193.
198 The testimony of police officers as to an accused's high level of intoxication upon arrest is also
important evidence because of their credibility: see ibid.
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during which period of time he apparently did nothing other than possibly drink more beer. There was no
attempt by him to conceal anything, and no evidence that the scene was disturbed in any way.
199
By contrast, rational behaviour after the crime can prevent a successful defence. In R. v.
McDonald,2" for example, the accused had the mental awareness to prevent his children
from seeing the victim's body and this worked against his intoxication defence.
Intoxication may be relevant to setting the parole ineligibility period for second degree
murder. In Taylor, for example, the Court suggests that even if the degree of intoxication is
not sufficient to result in a lesser charge of manslaughter, intoxication may still be considered
a mitigating factor in setting the parole ineligibility period.2"' By contrast, when dealing with
manslaughter sentencing, courts generally see alcohol as an aggravating factor. For example,
in R. v. Anablak, Kirkpatrick J. emphasized the role alcohol played in the spousal violence
at issue:
Alcohol gradually transformed [the accused's] relationship with [his partner] into something that was ugly,
demeaning, and destructive. Instead of patience and understanding, instead of respect, there was to be fear,
anxiety and hurt. In an accelerating crescendo of violence and anger, [the accused] repeatedly lashed out at
his common law partner while highly intoxicated.
20 2
In R. v. Duval, a manslaughter sentencing decision, the New Brunswick Queen's Bench
emphasized the accused's intoxication when referring to the need for general deterrence "to
others who may think that alcohol may be used as an excuse to physically abuse people and
then be treated lightly by the courts because of the alcohol."20 3 The link between intoxication
and spousal violence was clearly denounced in R. v. Foster where the Court stated:
An appropriate sentence for this type of case must reflect our society's concern for the sanctity of life, its
denunciation of spousal violence and its revulsion that anyone in a state of self-induced intoxication would
take an innocent life and thus a lengthy sentence must be imposed having in mind the gravity of such an
offence.
20 4
In Cook, where the Court assumed that the jury reached a manslaughter verdict on the
basis of intoxication, intoxication was considered an aggravating factor in sentencing the
accused to 16.5 years of imprisonment. A minority of courts have held that intoxication is
neither mitigating nor aggravating. In Boutilier, for example, the Court concluded that the
accused "ha[d] already received the benefit of this mitigating factor by being allowed to
plead to manslaughter."2 5 One context in which intoxication can indirectly be considered as
a mitigating factor is if, prior to trial, the accused enrols in a treatment program.20 6
194 Ibid. at para. 53.
200 2005 BCSC 473, [2005] B.C.J. No. 3091 (QL), aff'd 2007 BCCA 224, [2007] B.C.J. No. 1680 (QL).
201 Taylor, supra note 117 at para. 15.
202 2008 NUCJ 9, [2008] Nu.J. No. 8 at para. 3 (QL).
203 (1994), 145 N.B.R. (2d) 311 at para. 27 (Q.B.).
204 2004 NBQB 316, [2004] N.B.R. (2d) (Supp.) No. 57 at para. 5 I.
205 Boutilier, supra note 185 at para. 20.
206 See e.g. Strong, supra note 154 at para. 10.
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In summary, courts appear to be acutely aware of the need to deter spousal violence and
the link between violence and drugs and alcohol. Thus, they are reluctant to reduce murder
convictions to manslaughter on the basis of intoxication except in the clearest possible cases.
The cases in this study suggest that intoxication may play a bigger role in plea negotiations
than as a defence at trial.
2. PROVOCATION
There are several reasons for examining provocation in a study of sentencing for spousal
homicide. The first, and most obvious, is that provocation is a defence that only applies to
murder and that it reduces murder to manslaughter, thus providing for discretion in
sentencing. Second, provocation developed largely in response to men killing their wives or
their wives' lovers when they were discovered committing adultery.207 Third, the role of
provocation in excusing male violence against women has attracted significant criticism in
many jurisdictions. 20 8 These criticisms focus on the fact that provocation privileges the
emotions of anger and jealousy and may result in excusing men who kill after a history of
repeated abuse against the victim. There is particular concern about provocation defences
that are triggered by a woman leaving or attempting to leave a relationship or a woman
entering into a new relationship. Finally, the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Thibert
has raised concerns that the mere fact of a wife finding a new partner may ground a
provocation defence.20 9
The implications of a successful provocation defence cannot be overstated. Not only does
provocation reduce murder to manslaughter, thus avoiding the mandatory minimum sentence
for murder, the Supreme Court has also held that provocation may be considered a mitigating
factor in setting the appropriate sentence for manslaughter. 21 While the Crown in Stone
argued strenuously against this idea of a "double benefit," the Supreme Court rejected the
characterization of a double benefit holding instead that it was necessary to consider
provocation in sentencing for manslaughter.
[T]o give s. 232 full effect, provocation must be considered in sentencing in cases where this section of the
Code has been invoked. The sentencing judge was therefore correct in considering provocation as a
mitigating factor in the present case. The argument that the provocation factor was spent because it had
already served to reduce the legal character of the crime overlooks the purpose ofs. 232 and therefore must
fail.
21 1
Thus, reducing murder to manslaughter on the grounds ofprovocation will have a substantial
impact on sentencing in the context of spousal homicide.
207 See Horder, supra note 23 at 15-45.
208 Wayne Gorman, "Provocation: The Jealous Husband Defence" (1999) 42 Crim. L.Q. 478; Caroline
Forell, "Gender Equality, Social Values and Provocation Law in the United States, Canada and
Australia" (2006) 14 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol'y & L. 27; Victoria Nourse, "Passion's Progress:
Modem Law Reform and the Provocation Defense" (1997) 106 Yale L.J. 1331; Horder, ibid.
209 Gorman, ibid.
210 Stone, supra note 32.
211 Ibid. at para. 237.
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Other than Stone, which dealt with provocation almost entirely in the sentencing context,
we do not have a recent spousal homicide decision with provocation from the Supreme Court
of Canada.1 2 The most recent decision we have dealing with provocation in the intimate
partner context involved an accused who killed his estranged wife's new partner. Thus, while
not strictly speaking a spousal homicide case, Thibert raised similar issues about a man's
perceived entitlement to access to his estranged wife and the mitigating role of sexual
jealousy in this context. Further, Thibert suggests that, in some circumstances, a woman
leaving a relationship may trigger the defence of provocation.
In Thibert, the accused's wife had left him and was having a relationship with one of her
co-workers. Mr. Thibert was upset about the estrangement and made several attempts to
contact her, eventually following her to her place of work where a confrontation took place
involving Thibert, his wife, and her new male partner. The victim began walking towards the
accused, with his hands on the wife's shoulders swinging her back and forth, saying, "[c]ome
on big fellow, shoot me? You want to shoot me? Go ahead and shoot me." '213 Thibert then
shot and killed him. He was charged with first degree murder but convicted of second degree
murder. Thus, the jury clearly rejected the provocation defence.
Thibert appealed his conviction arguing that the trial judge erred in failing to tell the jury
that the Crown had the burden of disproving provocation. On appeal, all parties agreed that
the judge had erred in this respect. However, the Crown argued that the judge should never
have put provocation to the jury in this case and, therefore, that the mistake did not prejudice
the accused. Thus, the issue was whether there was an evidentiary foundation for putting
provocation to the jury.
The Court was divided 3:2 with Cory J. writing for the majority and Major J. for the
dissent. The majority held that the act or insult must be one that, in light of the history of the
relationship, could have deprived an ordinary person of self-control, the ordinary person
being of the same age and sex as the accused and sharing the same characteristics that gave
the insult particular significance. The majority looked at the ordinary person whose marriage
had broken up and who had gone to speak with his wife in private. With regard to the
subjective test, the provoking words from the deceased were unanticipated and the events
unfolded in a matter of seconds. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to put provocation to the
jury and a new trial was warranted.
The majority decision in Thibert is troubling in several respects. Thibert precipitated the
confrontation and took a loaded weapon to the scene. 1 4 Yet the victim's words in response
to this threat were found capable of depriving the ordinary person of self-control. The
accused admitted that he had earlier contemplated killing his wife. When he then triggers a
deadly confrontation, how can he claim he was acting on the sudden in response to
provocation by the words of the man he was threatening? The dissenting opinion in Thibert
212 Provocation was in fact raised in Parent, supra note 138, but the Supreme Court of Canada chose to
limit its analysis to the relationship of anger on mens rea under s. 229(a)(ii) and did not address the
substance of the provocation claim.
213 Thibert, supra note 25 at para. 26.
214 For reference to the concept of men who engineer a confrontation and in essence set up the provocation
see Jenny Morgan, "Provocation Law and Facts: Dead Women Tell No Tales, Tales Are Told about
Them" (1997) 21 Melbourne U. L. Rev. 237.
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held that there was no evidence of a wrongful act or insult sufficient to deprive an ordinary
person of self-control. Justice Major stressed the danger of characterizing the fact of an
extramarital affair as the basis of provocation pointing out that no one has an "emotional or
proprietary right or interest in a spouse that would justify the loss of self-control that the
appellant exhibited."
'215
Thibert has been harshly criticized. Wayne Gorman suggests that the majority has turned
provocation into the "defence of jealousy or anger. ' Gorman goes so far as to say the
Supreme Court has upheld the long-standing rule that life imprisonment is disproportionate
for someone who kills an adulterous wife. Gary Trotter argues that it will be difficult for a
judge to refuse to put provocation to the jury in cases where men kill their spouses as a
response to infidelity. 17 In light of these concerns, this article examines the cases where
provocation was raised in the present sample to see if these concerns have been borne out.
How often is provocation successful and in what circumstances? Are courts of appeal more
likely after Thibert to require that provocation be put to the jury?
There were 37 cases in this sample where provocation was raised, or approximately 15
percent of the 252 cases.2 18 There were seven cases where the defence was successful, 19 and,
in one of these it was impossible to tell whether the jury had based its decision on
provocation or intoxication.22 This represents a success rate of approximately 19 percent
amongst the cases where provocation was raised and approximately 3 percent of the total
sample. In two further cases, courts of appeal sent the case back for a new trial on the basis
of the errors regarding the law of provocation.22 1 In the first of these cases, Kent,22 2 the
accused first strangled his wife with his hands and then tied a dog leash around her neck
ostensibly to end her suffering quickly in response to her verbal "provocation." The accused
testified that he "flipped" when his wife started calling him "worthless" and "not even as
good as her ex-husband. ' '223 In R. v. Parent,224 not included as a successful case, provocation
was successful at the first trial but unsuccessful after the Supreme Court of Canada sent the
case back for a second trial.
215 Thibert, supra note 25 at para. 65.
216 Gorman, supra note 208 at 478-79.
217 Gary T. Trotter, "Anger, Provocation, and the Intent for Murder: A Comment on R. v. Parent" (2002)
47 McGill L.J. 669.
218 This sample does not capture cases where the accused has killed his former partner's new lover such as
in Thibert, supra note 25.
219 Success here refers to the defence being successful at trial and not reversed on appeal.
220 R. v. Montgomery (1997),209 AR. 38 (C.A.) [Montgomery]; Stone, supra note 32; R. v. Cairns, 2004
BCCA 219, [2004] B.C.J. No. 771 (QL) [Cairns]; Li, supra note 187; R. v. Kimpe, [2008] O.J. No. 2087
(Sup. Ct. J.) (QL) [Kimpe]; Strong, supra note 154. In Archibald, supra note 154, the manslaughter
verdict could have been based on intoxication and/or provocation. In Strong, a charge of murder was
reduced to manslaughter after the preliminary but the judge made it clear that the charge was reduced
because of provocation and thus I am including it as a successful provocation case.
221 R. v. Carpenter (1993), 14 O.R. (3d) 641 (C.A.); Kent, supra note 38. However, note the comments of
Southin J. in her (reluctant) concurring minority judgment in Kent, where she suggests that ajury verdict
of manslaughter at a new trial "would be to condone quite appalling domestic violence" (at para. 77).
See also Strong, ibid..222 Kent, ibid.
223 Ibid. at para. 1I.
224 2001 SCC 30, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 761. The accused was originally charged with first degree murder then
found guilty of manslaughter probably on the basis of provocation. The Supreme Court of Canada
ultimately ordered a new trial because the trial judge erred in his instruction regarding the impact of
anger on the mens rea for s. 229. At his second trial, the accused was convicted of second degree
murder: see Parent, supra note 138.
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If one considers the overall sample, the success rate for provocation is fairly low.
However, when looking only at cases where the defence is raised, there is almost a 20
percent success rate. These numbers almost certainly understate the role of provocation in
reducing murder to manslaughter. For example, it is clear from the cases that provocation
may lead the Crown to accept a guilty plea to manslaughter, making a discussion of
provocation unnecessary at trial.225
Nonetheless, the successful cases are useful in examining what factors are likely to be at
play in these cases. Most notably, in all but one of the cases where provocation was
successful, there was no history of violence between the parties. In the exception, Li,226 the
accused had been charged a month prior to the killing with punching his wife once.
Similarly, several of the cases involving successful provocation defences involved physical
provocation by the deceased against the accused. For example, in Strong, the deceased hit
the accused with a beer bottle on the back of his head. In Li, the deceased slapped the
accused and yelled at him. In Montgomery,227 there were also allegations of assault by the
deceased against the accused, which left visible marks of trauma on the accused's face. 2 In
a few of these cases, there was evidence of an injury to the accused 229 or a witness to the
victim's provoking actions, not just the testimony of the accused. 2 0 However, in none of
these cases was the physical violence against the accused even close to being life-
threatening.
In cases not involving physical provocation, the alleged provocation consisted of, in one
case, asking for money in exchange for sex so that the victim could use the money for
gambling.23" ' In Archibald, the deceased had been having an affair and apparently had just
told the accused that her lover was coming over at the time of the killing.2 In Stone, the
accused stabbed his wife after she allegedly taunted him about his sexuality and cast doubt
on whether he was the biological father of his children from a previous relationship.
233
Evidence of extreme brutality is evident in several successful provocation cases.234 In
Stone, the accused stabbed his wife 47 times; 235 in Strong, the accused inflicted 22 abrasions
and punctures with a knife.236 In Archibald, the accused stabbed the victim several times
although we are not told the precise number. 7 In Kimpe, the accused strangled his partner
225 See e.g. R. v. Couture, 2001 YKTC 51, [2001] Y.J. No. 137 (QL), where the victim attacked the accused
immediately prior to the killing and the Crown accepted the plea of guilty to manslaughter likely on the
basis of provocation.
226 Supra note 187. The Crown appealed in this case arguing that there was no air of reality to the defence
of provocation but the Court of Appeal, while characterizing the evidence as weak, upheld the
manslaughter verdict.
227 Supra note 220.
22s In Kimpe, supra note 220, it is impossible to decipher the nature of the provocation from the sentencing
decision. We only know that her words "went beyond a repudiation of their relationship" (at para. 5).
229 In Strong, supra note 154, the deceased hit the accused with a beer bottle on the back of his head. This
case has the lowest sentence of any of the successful provocation cases. See text below at notes 255-58
for discussion of sentencing in these cases.
235 See e.g. Young, supra note 36, where a witness heard the victim repeatedly telling the accused that their
relationship was over and that she was leaving him.
231 See Cairns, supra note 220.
232 Archibald, supra note 154.
233 Stone, supra note 32.
234 See Gray, supra note 134, where the defence was unsuccessful.
235 Stone, supra note 32.
236 Strong, supra note 154.
237 Archibald, supra note 154.
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to death with his hands; the Court noted that "this was an act of extreme violence with the
use of strong force over an extended period oftime." '238 It would appear that extreme brutality
does not necessarily lead juries away from the defence of provocation. One could argue, by
contrast, that extreme violence could sometimes be used to support the notion of a loss of
self-control on the part of the accused. The normative question is whether this makes the
killing less blameworthy and worthy of mitigation.
Of the seven cases where provocation was successful, only two were decided prior to
Thibert.239 Of the remaining five, three were clearly decided after Thibert.24 Two others were
decided right around the time of Thibert. In Stone, the jury trial took place before Thibert was
released. The Supreme Court of Canada did cite Thibert in the appeal, albeit with no
discussion. In Strong, the sentence was imposed after a guilty plea to manslaughter a few
months after the release of Thibert and the case was not cited. It is also important to note that
there are more than double the number of cases after Thibert than before, thus one would
expect a higher number of successful provocation defences in this period. Thus, while the
majority of successful defences take place after Thibert that case does not appear to be the
determining factor in many, if any, cases.
The cases in this sample do not support the concern after Thibert that separation or
rejection by a female spouse will necessarily support a provocation defence.24' Thibert has
not resulted in the widespread expansion of the defence of provocation in the spousal
homicide context. Instead, we see courts referring to Thibert but interpreting it narrowly.
While courts acknowledge that triers of fact can look at the nature of the relationship
between the parties, reference is often made to the judgment of Dickson C.J.C. in Hill 42
where he held that, while ajury may consider the circumstances and certain characteristics
of the accused, that does not mean that a trial judge has to elaborate those circumstances for
the jury.243 As Dickson C.J.C. held in that case, "the 'collective good sense' of the jury will
naturally lead it to ascribe to the ordinary person any general characteristics relevant to the
provocation in question." 2" In R. v. Simpson,245 for example, the British Columbia Court of
Appeal held that Thibert allows the trier of fact to look at the history of the relationship but
does not require the judge to instruct the jury as such.246
While Thibert has not resulted in a wide-scale application of provocation in spousal
homicides, there are troubling aspects to several of the successful cases. In Stone itself, for
example, provocation succeeded where the victim merely taunted the accused about the
paternity of his children.247 In Cairns,248 the victim demanded money for sex and this was
seen as sufficient provocation to cause an ordinary person to lose self-control. In those cases
238 Kimpe, supra note 220.
239 See Montgomery, supra note 215; Archibald, supra note 154.
240 Cairns, supra note 220; Li, supra note 187; Kimpe, supra note 220.
241 Lees, supra note 26.
242 R. v. Hill, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 313 [Hill].
243 See e.g. R. v. Nahar, 2004 BCCA 77, 23 B.C.L.R. (4th) 269 [Nahar].
244 Hill, supra note 242 at para. 35.
245 1999 BCCA 310, 125 B.C.A.C. 44.
246 Ibid. at para. 55.
247 Stone, supra note 32.
248 Supra note 220.
HeinOnline -- 47 Alta. L. Rev. 811 2009-2010
where some physical altercation did take place, the injuries to the accused were never
serious. Thus, while Thibert might not be the sole culprit, it is difficult to explain why some
cases allowed the defence and others do not. For example, in Lees, 249 an impending
separation and a threat to falsely allege that the accused sexually abused his daughter were
held to be insufficient to satisfy the objective test; the Court of Appeal agreed with the
assessment.25 ° There thus seems to be a lack of consistency or predictability about what
verbal insults will satisfy the objective test.
One argument that has been put forward on the basis of Thibert is that cultural and
religious beliefs have to be incorporated into the objective test, a view that had been rejected
prior to Thibert .2 1 This issue has arisen in several spousal homicide cases involving women
who do not conform with stereotyped expectations about their behaviour. The argument is
that an accused person from a particular culture is more likely to lose self-control in the face
of infidelity or assertions of independence by his spouse. Courts of appeal have been
understandably reluctant to incorporate such an argument into the objective test. In Nahar,
the accused, relying on Thibert, based his argument on the "shared expectations among the
Sikh community, and the Indo-Canadian community at large, as to the proper conduct of a
married woman and as to the importance attached to these expectations. 252 The accused's
wife in this case did not accept his conventional beliefs about appropriate conduct for women
and she asserted her independence and made friends with a number of young Sikh women
who shared her views. The Court of Appeal did concede that Thibert requires that the
ordinary person be one that shares the accused's cultural background. However, it was not
enough to say that the ordinary person of this background would be upset by his wife's
conduct, the issue was whether the ordinary person of this background would lose his self-
control. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that this test could not be met and
held, relying on Hill, that the judge need not necessarily tell the jury what attributes should
be ascribed to the ordinary person.
In Humaid,253 the accused proffered evidence by an expert on the Islamic religion and
culture suggesting that infidelity on the part of a female member of the family was
considered a serious violation of the family's honour and warranted severe punishment by
the male members of the family. Immediately before the killing in Humaid, the victim made
reference to being on a "little pill," which, in the context, was seen as an admission of
infidelity. The accused argued, relying on Thibert, that such an insult had to be seen from the
perspective of an ordinary Muslim man who had been faced with his wife's infidelity. The
trial judge rejected the relevance of his religion to the objective test and this issue was
appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal was able to skirt around the
issue because it held that there was no evidence that the accused actually had these beliefs
himself. However, in several passages the Court made clear that it had grave concerns about
such an application of the objective test: "Assuming that an accused's religious and cultural
beliefs that are antithetical to fundamental Canadian values such as the equality of men and
249 Supra note 26.
250 Ibid.
251 SeeR. v. Ly (1987), 33 C.C.C. (3d) 31 (B.C.C.A.).
252 Nahar, supra note 243 at para. 3, citing the trial decision 2002 BCSC 928, [2002] B.C.J. No. 1424 at
para. 4 (QL).
253 R. v. Humaid (2006), 81 O.R. (3d) 456 (C.A.) [Humaid].
(2010) 47:3ALBERTA LAW REVIEW
HeinOnline -- 47 Alta. L. Rev. 812 2009-2010
INTIMATE FEMICIDE SENTENCING TRENDS
women can ever have a role to play at the'ordinary person' phase of the provocation inquiry,
the expert evidence could not assist this appellant." '254 The Court went on to distinguish
between revenge based on one's cultural beliefs and a loss of self-control:
Provocation does not shield an accused who has not lost self-control, but has instead acted out of a sense of
revenge or culturally driven sense of the appropriate response to someone else's misconduct. An accused
who acts out of a sense of retribution fuelled by a belief system that entitles a husband to punish his wife's
perceived infidelity has not lost control, but has taken action that, according to his belief system, is ajustified
response to the situation.
255
The overriding factor for the Court of Appeal was that values that are antithetical to
Canadian values, such as the view that women are inferior to men, should not become part
of the objective test.
It is arguable that as a matter of criminal law policy, the "ordinary person" cannot be fixed with beliefs that
are irreconcilable with fundamental Canadian values. Criminal law may simply not accept that a belief
system which is contrary to those fundamental values should somehow provide the basis for a partial defence
to murder.
256
The Court of Appeal in Humaid is recognizing the importance of gender equality in
attributing qualities and characteristics to the ordinary person. One would be hard pressed
to argue that the kind of stereotypical misogyny, depicted in Humaid's evidence as ordinary
in his culture, should be incorporated into an objective test in order to excuse spousal murder.
What is not mentioned, however, is how courts assume the ordinariness of the values
demonstrated in cases like Thibert and Stone. Thibert did not need to argue that his
proprietary view of his wife was consistent with typical Canadian cultural beliefs or with
gender equality. Stone's reaction, losing his control, and stabbing his wife over 40 times after
verbal provocation regarding the paternity of his children, is never examined in light of
whether such a defence is consistent with gender equality in Canada.257
The biggest impact of the provocation defence is on sentencing because the manslaughter
verdict gives the trial judge discretion in imposing a sentence. In Stone, as indicated above,
the Supreme Court of Canada did hold that provocation could be a mitigating factor in
sentencing although it is only one of numerous factors. In the present sample, there is a range
of sentences after a successful provocation defence from 30 months at the low end to ten
years at the high end. In Stone, the accused was sentenced to only seven years after stabbing
his wife over 40 times after purely verbal provocation. In Archibald, where intoxication and
provocation were raised, the accused was sentenced to four years at trial, which was reduced
to three years on appeal. In Strong, where the accused stabbed his wife 22 times, he was
sentenced to 30 months imprisonment. In Cairns, the victim demanded money for sex.
Provocation was successful at trial and the judge imposed a sentence of four years but the
254 Ibid. at para. 82.
255 Ibid. at para. 85 [footnotes omitted].
256 Ibid. at pars. 93.
257 Rosemary Cairns Way has demonstrated the problematic nature of accepting without question
mainstream views of our culture related to gender, class, and sexual orientation as ordinary: Rosemary
Cairns Way, "Culture, Religion, and the Ordinary Person: An Essay on R. v. Humaid" (2009-2010) 41
Ottawa L. Rev. I [forthcoming].
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British Columbia Court of Appeal held that the sentence did "not sufficiently express
denunciation for spousal manslaughter" and substituted a sentence of seven years.258
The highest sentence in any of the provoked manslaughters was ten years, which was
imposed in both Montgomery2 9 and Kimpe. The accused in Kimpe strangled his wife to death
and then set fire to his home while her body remained inside. He was convicted of
manslaughter at a jury trial as a result of a successful provocation defence. Despite
characterizing the accused as a "gentle giant" whose actions were completely out of
character, the trial judge sentenced him to ten years imprisonment. He stressed that domestic
violence is of particular concern to the courts and cannot be tolerated.26 °
There is the occasional judgment that takes the view that provoked manslaughters should
be sentenced more harshly than other manslaughters because they involve intentional killings
that would otherwise have been murder. In Li, for example, Ewaschuk J. took this position,
stressing the intentional nature of a provoked killing, and the importance of denouncing
spousal homicides, in imposing a sentence of eight years for a man who strangled his wife.
Thus, there is a wide range of sentences for provoked manslaughters from less than three
years to ten years but no sentence over ten years. The majority of provoked manslaughters
result in sentences below the average sentence for spousal manslaughter. It is not always
apparent from the facts of the case why some are treated more harshly than others, especially
given that provocation presumes an intentional killing. What is apparent, however, is that a
sentence for a provoked manslaughter will be significantly below what the accused would
have faced had he been convicted of murder. While the incidence of successful cases in this
sample is not alarming, the details of some of the successful cases are and demonstrate that,
despite the efforts of some courts, we have not reached a point where gender equality has
been fully incorporated into the defence of provocation.
III. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to draw precise conclusions from the above data because there are numerous
factors influencing the outcomes. For second degree murder, for example, the greatest impact
has probably come from the Shropshire decision, which has led to an increase in parole
ineligibility periods generally. It appears likely that s. 718.2 of the Criminal Code has also
given judges a specific reason for elevating parole ineligibility in spousal homicide cases.
Overall, parole ineligibility periods have increased since the pre-Shropshire era and are now
levelling off as courts begin to set ranges for spousal second degree murders. With
manslaughter, where Shropshire was not relevant, there has been an increase in the severity
of sentences. This is possibly because of s. 718.2, or at least the values reflected in that
section, although it took several years after the amendments to see the true impact of this
change. Overall, it is fair to say that judges have changed their perceptions of spousal
258 Cairns, supra note 220 at para. 98.
259 Supra note 220. The Court of Appeal gives no information as to the basis of the ten-year sentence on
the unsuccessful Crown appeal of the provocation defence. It is worthy ofnote that the accused had been
charged with first degree murder and the jury brought in a verdict of manslaughter.
260 Kimpe, supra note 220 at para. 7. It is difficult to determine from the appellate judgment in Montgomery,
ibid., what factors influenced the ten-year sentence.
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homicides in terms of where they fit on a continuum of moral fault and that, in recent years,
there has been recognition that killing an intimate partner is a particularly egregious form of
homicide.
Despite concerns that provocation and intoxication would result in excusing significant
numbers of men who kill their spouses, this fear does not appear to have materialized,
although there are a few very troubling decisions.26" ' With provocation, the success rate of the
defence is low and judges do not appear to be broadening the scope of the ordinary person
test significantly as was feared after the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Thibert.
Provocation does appear to provide a double benefit to the accused, however, in that it may
reduce murder to manslaughter and then still be seen as a mitigating factor in sentencing.
Intoxication, by contrast, does not appear to bestow this kind of double benefit. Once
intoxication has reduced a second degree murder to manslaughter, which only happens
rarely, it is unlikely to be seen as a mitigating factor and may well be seen as aggravating.
In general, therefore, the data in this article support the suggestion that courts have taken
an increasingly harsh stance against spousal homicides, which, prior to the late 1990s, were
more likely to be seen as less serious forms of culpable homicide. This is not to suggest that
increased sentences per se are always a positive development. Rather, what matters is the
recognition that, on the gradation of blameworthiness, spousal homicides lie on the top end
of the spectrum, not the bottom. The fact that one is killing someone with whom one has
shared an intimate relationship and a relationship of trust makes these killings particularly
blameworthy. Although one still sees remnants of the view that random killings will attract
the greatest concern, women continue to be at greatest risk at the hands of people they have
loved and the intimate and gendered nature of these homicides makes them particularly
heinous.
261 See e.g. Stone, supra note 32.
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APPENDIX 1
PAROLE INELIGIBILITY IMPOSED IN THE SECOND DEGREE MURDER CASES
FIVE YEARS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE SHROPSHIRE
At Sentencing On Appeal
R. v. McMurrer (1990), 84 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 248 (P.E.I.S.C. 10 years
(T.D.)).
R. v. McMurrer (1991), 89 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 36 (P.E.I.S.C. 12 years
(A.D.)).
R. v. Randhawa (1990), 104 A.R. 304 (C.A.). 15 years
R. c. Rhadbane, [1990] J.Q. no 2246 (C.A.) (QL). 15 years
R. v. Banash (1991), 75 Man. R. (2d) 70 (C.A.). 10 years
R. v. Doyle (1991), 108 N.S.R. (2d) I (S.C. (A.D.)). 10 years 17 years
R. v. Baillie (1991), 107 N.S.R. (2d) 256 (S.C. (A.D.)). 13 years 17 years
R. v. Edgecombe, [1991] O.J. No. 2044 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) 10 years
(QL).
R. v. Cameron (1992), 7 0.R. (3d) 545 (C.A.). 10 years
R. v. Lemky (1992), 17 B.C.A.C. 71. 10 years
R. v. Guillemene, [1993] B.C.J. No. 2092 (S.C.) (QL). 10 years
R. v. A llegretti, [ 1994] O.J. No. 172 (C.A.) (QL). 10 years
R. v. Bain (1994), 130 N.S.R. (2d) 332 (C.A.). 10 years
R. v. Pabani (1994), 17 O.R. (3d) 659 (C.A.). 12 years 10 years
R. v. Deocharran, [1994] O.J. No. 3145 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) 10 years
(QL).
R. v. Joanisse (1995), 85 O.A.C. 186. 10 years
R. v. Loubier, [1995] O.J. No. 2035 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) (QL). 17 years
R. v. Morrow, [1995] O.J. No. 4052 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) (QL). 15 years
R. v. McCormack (1995), 83 O.A.C. 73. 14 years 12 years
R. v. Muir (1995), 80 O.A.C. 7. 12 years 10 years
R. v. Munroe (1995), 79 O.A.C. 41. 12 years 12 years
R. v. Sarao (1995), 80 O.A.C. 236. 25 years 22 years
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APPENDIX 2
PAROLE INELIGIBILITY IMPOSED IN THE SECOND DEGREE MURDER CASES
FIVE YEARS IMMEDIATELY AFTER SHROPSHIRE
At Sentencing On Appeal
R. v. Bajrangie-Singh, [1996] O.J. No. 5336 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) 15 years
(QL).
R. v. Bajrangie-Singh (2003), 170 O.A.C. 99. 13 years
R. v. Beamish (1996), 144 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 357 (P.E.I.S.C. 18 years
(T.D.)).
R. v. D.B., [1996] B.C.J. No. 1485 (S.C.) (QL), aff'd 91 20 years 20 years
B.C.A.C. 298.
R. v. Tan (1996), 75 B.C.A.C. 181. 13 years 13 years
R. v. Stewner (1996), 113 Man. R. (2d) 78 (C.A.). 20 years 20 years
R. c. Artesen, [1997] J.Q. no 1845 (C.S.) (QL). 12 years
R. v. Parnar (1997), 41 O.T.C. 104 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)). 15 years
R. c. R.P., [1997] J.Q. no 279 (C.S.) (QL). 12 years
R. v. Cross (1998), 171 N.S.R. (2d) 56 (S.C.). 12 years
R. v. Savoie (1998), 209 N.B.R. (2d) 378 (Q.B. (T.D.)). 15 years
R. v. Assoun (1999), 182 N.S.R. (2d) 344 (S.C.). 18.5 years
R. v. Allen, 1999 BCCA 117, 122 B.C.A.C. 286. 13 years
R. c. Coutu, [1999] J.Q. no 1809 (C.S.) (QL). 10 years
R. v. McKnight (1999), 44 O.R. (3d) 263 (C.A.). 17 years 14 years
R. v. Plaha, [1999] O.J. No. 5577 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL). 12 years
R. v. Rushton, [ 1999] Y.J. No. 62 (S.C.) (QL), aff'd 2000 YTCA 17 years 17 years
5, 143 B.C.A.C. 295.
R. v. Stewart, [1999] N.B.J. No. 415 (Q.B. (T.D.)) (QL). 14 years
R. v. Stephen, 1999 ABCA 190, 244 A.R. 372. 15 years
R. v. Ullah, [1999] O.J. No. 2767 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL). 15 years
R. v. Wristen (1999), 47 O.R. (3d) 66 (C.A.). 17 years 17 years
R. v. Belliveau, 2005 BCCA 283, 212 B.C.A.C. 279. 13 years
R. v. JG.F., 2000 BCCA 140, 135 B.C.A.C. 35. 15 years
R. v. Gray, [2000] O.J. No. 5317 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL). 12 years
R. v. G.W.F., 2000 BCSC 508, [2000] B.C.J. No. 1853 (QL). 17 years
R. v. Krugel (2000), 129 O.A.C. 182. 10 years
R. v. Ogden (2000),187 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 134 (Nfld. S.C. (T.D.)). 14 years
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APPENDIX 3
PAROLE INELIGIBILITY IMPOSED IN THE SECOND DEGREE MURDER CASES
DECIDED BETWEEN 2001-2008
At Sentencing On Appeal
R. c. Bolduc, [2001] J.Q. no 1532 (C.S.) (QL). 12 years
*R. v. Czibulka, [2001 ] O.J. No. 6115 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL). 17 years
R. v. Johnson, 2001 NSSC 119, 196 N.S.R. (2d) 267. 21 years 21 years
R. v. Paquette (2001), 153 O.A.C. 149. 14 years 14 years
R. c. Parent, [2001] J.Q. no 6833 (C.S.) (QL). 12 years
R. v. Peterfy, 2001 BCCA 698, 162 B.C.A.C. 24. 15 years 15 years
R. v. Spindler, [2001] O.J. No. 4899 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL). 11 years
R. v. Teske, [2001] O.J. No. 1900 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL). 16 years
R. v. Teske (2005), 202 O.A.C. 239. 13 years
R. v. F.K., 2003 BCCA 703, 192 B.C.A.C. 220. 20 years 20 years
R. v. K. WM, 2003 BCCA 688, 190 B.C.A.C. 294. 20 years 20 years
R. v. Sodhi (2003), 66 O.R. (3d) 641 (C.A.). 14 years 14 years
R. v. Curry, 2004 BCCA 144, 197 B.C.A.C. 6. 10 years
R. c. Daigle, [2004] J.Q. no 13829 (C.S.) (QL). 12 years
R. c. Dagenais, [2004] J.Q. no 12142 (C.S.) (QL). 12 years
R. v. Falkner, 2004 BCSC 986, 188 C.C.C. (3d) 406. 25 years 25 years
R. v. Moo, [2004] O.J. No. 2234 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL). 12 years
*R. v. Trochym (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 611 (C.A.). 10 years 10 years
R. v. Guiboche, 2004 MBCA 16, 180 Man. R. (2d) 276. 10 years
R. c. MP., [2004] J.Q. no 8702 (C.S.) (QL). 25 years
Poissant c. R., 2007 QCCA 205, [2007] J.Q. no 998 (QL). 15 years
R. c. Picard, [2004] J.Q. no 4332 (C.S.) (QL). 10 years
R. v. Diep, 2005 ABQB 81, [20051 A.J. No. 106 (QL). 10 years
R. v. Lenius, [2005] S.3. No. 526 (Q.B.) (QL). 15 years
R. v. Lenius, 2007 SKCA 65, 299 Sask. R. 139. 12 years
R. v. D.W.M, 2005 BCSC 1061, [2005] B.C.J. No. 1578 (QL). 10 years
R. v. Neumann, 2005 BCSC 1820, [2005] B.C.J. No. 2883 (QL). 12 years
R. c. Rizzolo, [2005] J.Q. no 19927 (C.S.) (QL). 13 years
R. v. Howard, [2006] O.J. No. 1350 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL). 15 years
R. v. Ingraham, [20061 O.J. No. 1207 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL). 11 years
R. v. JV, [2006] O.J. No. 2392 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL). 17 years
R. v. Labidi, [2006] O.J. No. 3138 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL). 15 years
R. v. Nichols, [2006] O.J. No. 2868 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL). 12.5 years
R. v. Oigg, 2006 MBQB 68, 202 Man. R. (2d) 219 14 years
R. v. Ramkissoon (2006), 216 O.A.C. 388. 14 years 14 years
R. v. White, 2006 ABQB 909,408 A.R. 64. 17 years
R. v. W.J.D., 2006 SKCA 91, 285 Sask. R. 225. 14 years
R. c. Morin-Cousineau, 2006 QCCS 2289, [2006] J.Q. no 3872 (QL). 13 years
R. v. Parsons, 2007 NLTD 108, 267 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 191. 12 years
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R. v. Taylor, 2007 BCSC 390, [2007] B.C.J. No. 593 (QL).
R. v. VanEindhoven, 2007 NUCJ 2, [2007] Nu.J. No. 2 (QL).





* A new trial was ordered in both of these cases and no sentencing information is available.
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Sentence (original) Sentence (appeal)
R. v. Zimmer, [1990] S.J. No. 654 (C.A.) (QL). 15 years 10 years
R. v. Archibald (1992), 15 B.C.A.C. 301. 5 years 4 years
R. v. Pepin, [1992] O.3. No. 452 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) (QL). 10 years
R. v. Sinclair (1992), 81 Man. R. (2d) 154 (C.A.). 6 years 6 years
R. v. Calladine, [ 1993] O.J. No. 1637 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) (QL). 13 years
R. c. Jenkins (1993), 57 Q.A.C. 5. Suspended Suspended
R. v. Shorty, [1993] Y.J. No. 101 (S.C.) (QL). Suspended
R. v. Standring, [1993] O.J. No. 4233 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) (QL). 8 years
R. v. Wedel(1993), 88 Man. R. (2d) 115 (C.A.). 15 years II years
R. v. Duval(1994), 145 N.B.R. (2d) 311 (Q.B. (T.D.)). 6 years
R. v. Lastheels, [1994] O.J. No. 1181 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) (QL). 46 months
R. v. Bell, [1995] O.J. No. 4533 (Ct.J. (Gen. Div.)) (QL). 7 years, 3 months
R. v. G.MW. (1995), 61 B.C.A.C. 6. 5 years 5 years
R. v. Ghazal, [1995] 28 W.C.B. (2d) 547. 9 years
R. v. Gray, [1995] O.J. No. 236 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) (QL). 6 years
R. v. Mintert (1995), 57 B.C.A.C. 232. 7 years 7 years
R. v. Jackson (1996), 184 A.R. 93 (C.A.). 10 years 10 years
R. v. Strong (1996), 17 O.T.C. 252 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)). 30 months
R. v. Montgomery (1997), 209 A.R. 38 (C.A.). 10 years
R. v. Stone, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290. 7 years 7 years
R. v. Zagorac (1997), 200 A.R. 305 (C.A.). Life
R. c. Lemay (1998), 127 C.C.C. (3d) 528 (Qc. C.A.). 20 years 13 years
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Sentence (original) Sentence (appeal)
R. v. Klassen (1997), 95 B.C.A.C. 136 (Y.C.A.). 5 years 5 years
R. v. Augustine, [1999] O.J. No. 2501 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) (QL). 9 years
R. v. Augustine, [2002] O.J. No. 1927 (C.A.) (QL). 7.5 years
R. v. K.E.L. (1999), 223 N.B.R. (2d) 27 (Q.B. (T.D.)). 9 years
R. c. Ouellette, [1999] J.Q. no 6116 (C.S.) (QL). 2 years less a day
R. v. Hyjek, [2000] O.J. No. 3094 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL). 10 years
R. v. Saunders, [2000] O.J. No. 5622 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL). 8 years
R. v. Couture, 2001 YKTC 51, [2001] Y.J. No. 137 (QL). 3.5 years
R. v. McCulloch, 2001 BCCA 196, 153 B.C.A.C. 32. 12 years 12 years
R. v. Perrambalam, [2001] O.J. No. 3520 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL). 5.5 years
R. v. Raddi, 2001 NWTSC 50, [2001] N.W.T.J. No. 54 (QL).
R. v. Sheppard, 2001 PESCTD 56, 202 Nfld. & P.E.1.R. 172.
R. v. Pearson, 2002 NBQB 218, [2002] N.B.R. (2d) (Supp.)
No. 49.
R. v. White, 2002 SKQB 104, 216 Sask. R. 218.
R. v. Wildeman, 2002 BCCA 112, 173 B.C.A.C. 214.
10 years
10 years
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Sentence (original) Sentence (appeal)
R. v. Beaulne, [2003] O.J. No. 5344 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL). 10 years
R. v. Boutilier, [2003] O.J. No. 4515 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL). II years
R. c. Dadgar, [2003] Q.J. No. 15818 (S.C.) (QL). 20 years
Dadgar c. R., [2004] J.Q. no 5702 (C.A.) (QL). 20 years
R. v. D.R. W.C., 2004 ABQB 21, 351 A.R. 130. 10 years
R. v. Ellsworth, 2003 BCSC 1315, [2003] B.C.J. No. 2031 10 years
(QL).
R. c. Larochelle, [2003] J.Q. no 3381 (C.S.) (QL). 3 years
R. v. T.J.N., 2003 BCPC 368, [2003] B.C.J. No. 2363 (QL). 8.5 years
R. v. T.J.N., 2004 BCCA 374, 200 B.C.A.C. 274. 8.5 years
R. v. Cairns, 2004 BCCA 219, [2004] B.C.J. No. 771 (QL). 4 years 7 years
R. c. Dias, [2004] Q.J. No. 15780 (S.C.) (QL). 14 years
R. v. Foster, 2004 NBQB 316, [2004] N.B.J. No. 335 (QL). 10 years
Kane c. R., 2005 QCCA 753, 202 C.C.C. (3d) 113. 18 years 18 years
R. c. Lefebvre, [2005] J.Q. no 111 (C.S.) (QL). 8 years
R. v. Li, [2005] O.J. No. 4145 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL). 8 years
R. v. S.J.I., 2005 NWTSC 92, [2005] N.W.T.J. No. 94 (QL). 8 years
R. v. Chan, 2006 ONCJ 436, [2006] O.J. No. 4565 (QL). 4 years
R. c. Cook, 2006 QCCS 3632, [2006] J.Q. no 7248 (QL). 16.5 years
R. v. Jaworski (2006), 203 Man. R. (2d) 249 (Prov. Ct.). 34 months
R. v. Loppie, [2006] O.J. No. 1025 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL). 15 years
R. v. Anbalak, 2008 NUCJ 9, [2008] Nu.J. No. 8 (QL). 15 years
R. v. Bridle, 2007 BCSC 1302, [2007] B.C.J. No. 2051 (QL). 9 years
R. v. Montgrand, 2007 SKCA 102, 304 Sask. R. 150. Life Life
R. v. Kimpe, [2008] O.J. No. 2087 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL). 10 years
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